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BAR BRIEFS

PRESIDENT'S
HON. JOHN

ADDRESS

H.

LEWIs

By custom, which sometimes does not seem a wise one, an
address by the president is a regular part of the anual meeting.
When I at last sit down to write one, after mulling it over for a
year, I am impressed by the vast number of things that might be
said, my inability to say them, and the difficulty of picking out
something concrete enough to be worth while. Bar association
meetings are like Sunday sermons, of little value unless their influence and principles continue over into the week.
Glittering
generalities gain us nothing.
As we grow older we grow broader minded, and are lucky if
we can keep a part of the earnest convictions of youth. Experience
of life makes our judgments both kinder and vaguer. Among so
many sides of so many questions, who is to say Which is right, or
even preferable? And yet the calm contemplation of Nirvana makes
no actual progress; our job must 'be to get an inkling of the meaning of the world if we can, and then do our bit in a small corner
of it. Frankly acknowledging these limitations, let us try to lay
down a principle or two, and then offer no apologies if we deal
with minutiae.
It ought to go without saying that the main principle of a lawyer's life, as of any other life, should be service. We are all herc
to make the world a little better, and the lawyer especially to make
it better in the enforcement of fixed rules of conduct between man
and man. Therein lies his technical problems; tthe larger problems of men as a whole deal with the development of economic
and social systems and personal conscience. Nothing,. it seems to
me, can take the place of this personal conscience; no systems can
of themselves reform the world, though they may help mightily in
such reform by appealing to the conscience in the wisest way.
At times we grow discouraged, and feel that all is wrong with
the world and especially-with the law; that, as one maker of bon
mots expressed it, "We have no courts of justice, only courts of
law". Yet really we have accomplished much; the "success of
justice", as one of our speakers reminded us last year, are enormous. It is always the failures which stand out, the moreso when
they are distinct exceptions, not in consonance with the background.
And we do well to devote our attention to them; we should aim,
not for self-satisfaction, but for improvement.
It would be foolish to expect that we can have perfect law obedience or perfect law enforcement, as long as we do not have perfect men. It would indeed be a sad situation if we had. Laws
are of necessity framed in general terms, to meet the average case,
and framed in ironclad fashion. The great safety valve of necessary exceptions is the jury. If the jury had- today its historic
function, of triers of fact under the superintendence and with the
assistance of the judge, instead of being left to wander in a mass of
evidence and oratory, deprived of the help of one unbiassed expert
in the court room, we should hear less of its faults. Yet it must
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be admitted that law obedience and law enforcement are at a low ebb
in this country. No one wishes the network of detailed regulation
that characterized pre-war Germany, but that is no argument for a
condition approaching anarchy.
Never has there been an experiment in democracy before on the
scale of that today in the United States. All former democracies
were comparatively small and homogeneous. The nearest approach
to it is in England, which is indeed large in population, but homogeneous, and surrounded by innumerable restrictions from custom.
Today, when custom is, comparatively speaking, losing its force in
England, thinkers are asking whether their democracy can last.
Monarchies and oligarchies have regularly made use of strong
and skilled men. Democracies hesitate to do so. Liberty and order
find it difficult to share the same throne. They must, if success is
to be attained. Perhaps the greatest need of democracy is the willing and intelligent employment of experts.
We cannot have a reasonable degree of law enforcement in a
democracy unless we have the spirit of the people behind the laws;
we cannot have a reasonable degree of law enforcement unless we
have a reasonable degree of voluntary law observance. And that
we cannot have if we insist on having too many laws. Because
in its nature law must be fixed and ironclad, it should deal only
with the main situations of life, leaving much to be regulated by
public opinion. When this principle is violated, as it is universally
in this country, disobedience and disrespect for law, and inability to
enforce it, are the inevitable result. It am not speaking of that
bone of contention, that leading subject of discussion and dispute,
the eighteenth amendment; whatever be our views on that, and they
are almost as many as there are men to discuss it,it deals with a
large problem, .probably with an extra-hazardous instrument, and
may well justify a solution of its own. I am speaking of prohibitions in general. When a can cannot legally smoke in a public
dining-room or drive an automobile through town faster than tert
miles an hour, the result is a foregone conclusion. The sport of
law-breaking will, last as long as the sport of law-making.
I refer, of course, to unconsidered laws, those which aim to.
enforce upon the community as a whole the ideas of a vociferous:
minority on unimportant details. The increased complexity of.
modern life renders inescapable a great increase of regulations
such as would have been intolerable in pioneer times, when human
relations were more personal and many such matters could be governed 'by give and take between men personally acquainted with
each other. Under modern conditions, traffic, zoning and factory
laws have become necessities, and can be expected to increase
year by year.
As always, the remedy is more difficult than the diagnosis. I ain
neither a prophet nor the son of a prophet, and cannot suggest
an infallible solution. If I venture to make suggestions for improvement, then, as the actor said in the old play, "I may be wrong;
I usually am". No doubt the great but slow remedy for all evils
lies in education, in the development of public opiniou. But, in the
face of the earned stigma of being a lawless nation, we, and
especially those sworn to uphold the law, may not well shrink from
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an attempt to do something, however, inadequate, to bring about improvement. I am inclined to agree with the school that feels that
one remedy lies in attempted enforcement, which will test the reasonableness of laws that are now dead letters.
Our system of criminal procedure is hopelessly antiquated. Born
in a time when such offenses as poaching were punishable by death,
and the decency of human nature ameliorated conditions by a system of technical loopholes, it has long since been discarded in England, but has persisted in America into a day when it has become the
shield of the criminal. Not that the English system of justice is
perfect. In an English court room one feels instinctively that the
stage is set for conviction. But at least the most important party in
interest, the public, is protected, and the principle of the greatest
good of the greatest number upheld. The English rule that no conviction shall be reversed unless the reviewing court believes that
justice has not been done does indeed take away from the jury the
final decision on questions of fact, but does away with a mass of
failures of justice. Such a provision is safer to administer in a
country where judges are appointed, and for life, selected for their
ability and not for political reasons of personal popularity, and given
ample salaries, than in one where the contrary conditions often prevail. If we hesitate to go quite that far, we might accomplish much,
provided the courts would administer the rule in the right spirit, by
a provision that there should not 'be a reversal unless the reviewing
court felt it probable that error of law below "had changed the verdict that would otherwise have been rendered. Nothing will be
accomplished, however, if the courts insist on emasculating such a
statute and continuing the common law by construction.
If in some degree I criticise the courts, it is because everyone
has the right to criticise them; that is the privilege of a free citizen,
and should go hand in hand with respect for the courts. They are,
of course, no more perfect than the lawyers or the farmers. They
are the product of our system, and it is surprising that, all in all,
they should be so good. 'When Chief Justice Marshall made his
famous statement that "this is a government of laws and not of
men," he said something that is splendid for its psychological effect
and as the statement of an ideal, but that as a statement of fact is
arrant nonsense. No judge worthy of his salt would be consciously
influenced, by considerations of politics, friendship, or his personal
economic or religious views; no judge whatever can help being un*consciously influenced by them all, just as none of the rest of us can
help it. To protect him as far as possible from such influences, we
owe it to him and to ourselves togive him a long tenure of office, a
sufficient salary, and such method of appointment or election as
shall reduce 'to a minimum the inevitable human influences. And
-inthe meantime, as well as when the millenium arrives, we owe him
respect, cooperation, indulgen~e for the human weaknesses which
he shares with the rest of us, and admiration for the way in which
he does his duty under difficult circumstances.
Judges are of course only guessers at the law like the rest of us.
Under the principle that the voice of the people is the voice of God,
they are divinely appointed guessers, and we owe them and their
decisions the same kind of allegiance that we owe the president of
the United States, whether or not he happens to belong to our party.
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As a matter of fact most legal questions have two reasonable sides,
and in the last analysis about all any of us can say is that on the
whole this or that side appears the more logical and reasonable.
Without going into detail, I think it safe to say that many of the
technicalities of our criminal law could tbe repealed with little loss
of safety to the innocent, and much improvement in the punishment
of the guilty; retaining such substantial safeguards as are not in
their' essence technicalities, but provisions against a sort of mob
justice.
Why are not these reforms made? How shall they be made?
One reason why they have not been made is a great. inertia, perhaps
more in the public than in the legal profession, whose foremost
members have long advocated them. One reason is the distrust of
such altruistic -lawyers, by a public which has not learned to employ
experts. One reason, alas, is the opposition to them by lawyers who
prefer to play the game as they have learned, it, and feel that they
have a vested right to win bad cases -by their personal ability. Such
a viewpoint, while thoroughly human, is entirely indefensible. The
fact that it is-held by a small minority of lawyers, some of them
highly agreeable personally and very able, has done much to instill
into the public mind that distrust of lawyers as tricksters which is
a handicap to the honest and ethical majority of the bar, and is
responsible in part for the difficulty of making the voice of the bar
heard in our legislatures -when it is lifted in the cause of reform.
The remedy must be sought in an organized, earnest and continuous
campaign of education by the Bar; in a realization by some of its
members that thdir profession demands public service before personal gain, and in such disciplinary measures as may prove necessary.
The method of trying to prevent crime by extreme punishments
has been fully tried out in England in past centuries, and has been
a startling failure. Apparently it made human life so cheap that
people were willing to take all sorts of chances. Much the same
kind of thing has in fact happened with our multiplicity of laws
today; we are so certain to violate one of them between daylight
and. dark that we take our chances and give the matter no thought,
and slip into the mood where all law seems to have been made to be
violated. Certainty and swiftness of punishment, rather than severity, seem to be the great deterrents. In England a man's trial usually
follows within a few weeks or possibly days of his arrest, and on
conviction the sentence is carried out without delay. A somewhat
similar condition in New Jersey some years ago caused wide publicity for "Jersey justice."
In criminal cases I personally believe that every man is entitled
to a defense, and that a lawyer is justified in putting up the best case
he can, provided he does not resort to trickery. The litigation cannot be prevented, and the defendant is already in court and has vital
interests at stake. In civil cases the conditions are not the same.
From the plaintiff's point of view, there is no compulsion to bring
the lawsuit, and from the defendant's point of view a settlement may
be possible. In civil matters I cannot see that either the client or
the lawyer has a vested right to litigate a worthless or immoral case.
As I see'it, the lawyer has the right to put a failing debtor through
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bankruptcy, but not.to draw up for him a fraudulent transfer. He
has not the moral right to advise either a rich corporation or a
fraudulent promoter how to keep within the letter of the law while
violating its spirit. In accident cases he has not the right to bring
a "strike suit," either for a settlement or in hope of a verdict which
he practically knows is unjust. He cannot avoid responsibility for
these things by saying that it is his client's business, not his own.
He besmirches an honorable profession if he does not insist that his
clients as well as himself be decent. Cases where there is a fair
controversy he may honestly take, but not cases which rely for their
hope of victory on fraud, trickery, or appeals to passion or prejudice. The better lawyers keep to these rules, merely as a matter
of common morality between man and man. For those who do not,
disciplinary measures are practicable, and should be applied.
There are two methods of practising law, by no means mutually
exclusive, the method of litigation and the method of advice and
settlement. In large firms, different members specialize in these
different tasks, according to their natural inclination and abilities,
but most of us have to do both kinds of work. Both are of vital
importance; but it seems to me more and more, as I grow older,
that the job of keeping clients out of litigation is, speaking generally, as much more important than the job of getting them out of
court successfully as medical preventive work is than the cure of
disease. Leading business men would appear to share this view, as
with large corporations, although perhaps not with the usual country
client, the remuneration for this preventive work is higher. Court
congestion can also be lessened if the lawyers will try a large part
of their cases in their offices, and, with a reasonable client, it is
usually not hard to sit around atable with one's opponent and dispose of the litigation to the comparative satisfaction of all concerned.
The pendulum of life oscillates from age to age. We are all
familiar with the old rule of an eye for an eye, and the Puritans in
their godliness made life not worth living. Today we are at the
other extreme, and tend to forgive everything. I have no doubt that
of the two, inexorability and kindliness, kindliness is the finer and
better, but the best course of all is generally to be found in the
golden mean. Some of the iron in the Puritan's constitution is
badly needed today. We have poor relief, institutions for the feebleminded, mother's pensions-all splendid things, -but all things which
tend to encourage' propagation of the unfit. We have passed the
stage where we can sit back and allow the laws of natural selection
and the survival of the fittest to work out our problems; our growing
feeling of altruism and decency, our self-respect, absolutely forbid
it. What is the result to be? That the unfit will propagate like
flies and inherit the earth? That the struggle for civilization and
progress must all be gone through over again? Not only law obedience and a reasonable punishment of criminals, but sterilization of
-criminals and of the unfit seems called for to save our civilization.
Of the popular criticisms of the bar, perhaps that which has the
-largest measure of truth is.
the charge of excessive conservatism.
Many prominent lawyers are indeed thoroughly progressive, leaders
of reform, but many cling to the idea that -'whatever is, is right"in economic matters, probably largely through their association with
property interests; in other matters sometimes through the dislike
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of learning new ways. In the excellent work that has been (lone
towards the study of the Constitution, one sometimes feels a tendency to place it on a pedestal for indiscriminating worship. Of
course our original Constitution was a compromise document, and
the more praiseworthy and successful for that very reason; but it
was not written by the finger of God, and from time to time has
called, and will still call for amendment. Such amendments, made
in a legal way, are always in order, whether they relate to the liquor
traffic or to rules of property. Let us hope that we will not fall into
the mistake that we have so thoroughly made with our State Constitutions, and as some think we have done with the eighteenth
amendment, of filling it with minor and shackling provisions, expressive only of temporary opinion. I am in thorough sympathy with
the kind of conservatism that refuses to rush into unconsidered reforms, and insists on thinking problems out before making changes;
but lawyers, who should be leaders of public opinion in this work,
cannot escape the responsibility for studying abuses and suggesting
solutions, and are not justified in merely sitting back and picking
flaws in proposed laws, without doing constructive work to find a
remedy.
Another criticism is of delay in our court procedure. I am convinced that much of this criticism is unfounded, and represents the
unreasoning public demand that orderly investigation be sacrificed to
speed; yet the leisurely methods of the profession in the past, more
tolerable then than in these days of hectic business activity, have
made for a certain inclination, to deliberateness that does not entirely accord with the business pace of the times. In some ways it
may be well that it does not. This is increased by the high degree
of professional courtesy so splendidly prevailing among members of
the Bar, which sometimes results in granting excessive postponements. In the large cities the lawyer's office is generally conducted
on a business basis, and I believe this is coming to 'be more the case
in the smaller communities. It is the duty of the courts as well as
of the lawyers to see that cases are tried without unreasonabld
delay. To a large extent the failure to do so is the fault of the
public, which refuses to furnish judges enough to attend to the
business. In our state calendars are not congested, and there is little
to criticise in this respect.
We are faced today with a tremendous tendency towards institutionalizing everything, until it sometimes seems as if robots or
mechanical men would soon do most of the work of the world.
Much of this is unquestionably real progress, but to some of us, perhaps old fogies, t'his 'breaking down of individualism is at times
depressing. In government, this tendency is shown by the multi
plicity of boards, commissions and general governmental activities
such as state bonding and state workmen's compensation. In law it
is shown by the increasing tendency to return to the old doctrine
of liability without fault. There was a day when the physical instrument causing injury became forfeit, by substantially a proceeding
in rem; then was developed the idea of responsibility of the owner
for moral fault, especially negligence; and again today the pendulum
swings towards recompense for damage however caused, so that the
phrase "damnum absque injuria" may soon become a thing of the
past. This is an inevitable trend of the times; a result of the complex machinery of modern civilization. When a cog slips, the dan-
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age is much greater than when contacts were less close, because
today we all tend to be bound together in an enormous machine of
many interrelated cogs. The law, of course, has never been logical
about it, as it has never been thoroughly logical about anything,
building itself up largely on considerations of practical results, the
traditional British muddling along. .1 have always felt that the
doctrine of responsibility for the acts of an agent lacked logic in a
system based on moral responsibility, and our criminal law has generally rejected it. It grew up, perhaps, through the idea that the
principal should use care enough in choosing his agent so that accidents would not happen-a doctrine quite unreasonable in huge
modern businesses. The first extension of liability came with extrahazardous instruments. Probably many courts, including our own,
would not have so extended the doctrine of agency as to hold that
a member of the family driving a pleasure car is the owner's agent,
or so restricted the application of contributory negligence in such
cases, but for the subconscious feeling that the automobile is an
extra-hazardous instrument. But today, judging from past standards, we are living in the midst of a mass of extra-hazardous instruments. Courts feel their way step by step in establishing a new
rule, which is only formulated by the student of law after it has
become practically established. In view of this tendency of the
times, it behooves us to consider how far it is to the public interest
to re-establish the doctrine of liability without fault, 'what should
be the extent and limitations of such a doctrine.
In the attempt to do what I have preached in these pages, offer
constructive suggestions, I venture to make certain recommendations
for the future work of the Association.
The work of the Citizenship and Americanization Committee
has been spendid. I recommend that this work be continued from
year to year, preferably in the grade schools as in the past, even
if the expense should require cutting down some of the other activities of the Association.
. I have not discussed, except by a brief reference, one of the most
important subjects of the day-the reform of the jury. This is
bound up on one side with the powers of judges, already the subject
of one of our committees. Dean Wigmore has written a thoughtful
article on this situation, which has been abstracted in recent issues
of Bar Briefs. I commend to your consideration the address of
President George M. Hogan to the 1928 meeting of the Vermont
Bar, entitled "The Strangled Judge." There is so much value in
the jury, and so much danger in some of its present features, which
seriously impair its usefulness and endanger its existence, that a
study of the situation by a special committee would seem well worth
while. I recommend that such a committee be appointed by the
incoming President, and that the subject be made a leading issue
of the 1930 meeting.
The vast increase in automobile traffic and in the power and
speed of automobiles, causing greatly increased accidents, presents a
problem with which our legislature must soon cope. Believing that
it is the duty of this Association to study stich a pressing problem
and investigate what legislation is desirable, before rather than after
the Legislature has acted, and attempt to prevent unwise and secure
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constructive legislation, I appointed a speciai committee on Automo-

bile Safety Regulations and Insurance. The Legislative Committee
refrained from taking any action, because the subject had not been
studied by the Association or any action taken at an Association
meeting. The majority report of the special committee is a splendid
piece of work from the point of view which it takes. As it and a
minority report Will be presented at this meeting, I shall not anticipate the discussion further than to point out that the problem may
be approached from either of two angles, increased safety on the
roads or securing payment for damages inflicted. It is not entirely
easy to achieve these results together, and there would seem no
doubt that the first is the more important. I commend this subject
to your consideration and hope that it will receive careful discussion
at this meeting, and I recommend, that a similar committee be appointed for the coming year, and that the meeting in 1930 take a
definite stand on the problem and submit its views to the next Legislatu re.
I believe that Bar Briefs has been useful in increasing professional solidarity and interest, and recommend that it be continued,
and that the members of the Bar form the habit of reading it and of
contributing to its pages as occasion may arise.
The Committee on Local Organizations has not functioned this
year as I had hoped it would. There are several City, County and
District Bar Associations in the State, of which some are active and
some are not. In this age of intense organization, it. is possible to
carry it too far, and find oneself i'n the position of the man whose
office system was so splendid that it left him no time to attend to
business. Nevertheless, I believe a reasonable amount of local organization supplements and aids the activities of the State Association, and makes, both in a social and, a distinctly professional way,
for the good of the profession. It has been suggested that the
State Association lay out a program of work for the local associations, in order that the relations between the two may be closer.
This suggestion may be worth considering. In any event, I recommend that the committee to be appointed the coming year keep in
touch with the activities of the local associations, and assist in
starting new ones where such a course seems advisable.
The subject of legal education is continually before us, although
under new forms as conditions change. It may or may not be time
for our Association to take an active part in urging higher legislative requirements for legal education and admission to the Bar, but
there can be no doubt that this is a subject which should enlist our
active interest. It is not for our own sake, but for that of the
public, that we must be interested in seeing that only well qualified
lawyers transact legal business. It would seem that there can be
little doubt that, to do so efficiently, something more is required than
a skeleton knowledge of legal forms and principles-the historical
and economic background to understand those principles.
Every once in a while is heard the complaint that laymen are
doing legal work-drawing deeds, mortgages and wills. In this
State we have no statute forbidding them to do so for pay, provided
they do not actually go into court. From a selfish point of view, the
mature and establisled lawyer has little objection to present condi-
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tions, feeling that the mistakes made by these our half-brothers are
productive of more lucrative business than they take away from
us. The public, however, which nowadays can be legally shaved
only by a duly certified barber, ought not to have the disposition of
its property depend on the ignorance of untrained craftsmen. Whenever the Legislature can 'be made to see that this practice is objected
to by the Bar for the good of the public, and not for its own good,
it will, as it should, be stopped by law.
The Committee on"Fee Schedule reports that it 'isinformed that
the schedule is being violated by a number of lawyers, some of them
leaders of the profession, especially as to fees in mortgage foreclosures. Probably few of us regard the schedule as susceptible of
universal application. It certainly cannot be taken to forbid charity
work, and to those who are accustomed to regulate our charges
largely by the importance of the work involved rather than on a
time basis, its minimum figures seem too high for certain minor
cases, and distinctly too low for others. But if it is not to be obeyed
in spirit it ought to be changed, and not furnish another example
of a law more honored in the breach than the observance. It has
done useful service by educating the Bar and public to a knowledge
of the value of efficient work. The profit of the lawyer is of far
less importance than the service to the client, but such service cannot, in the nature of things, be efficiently performed unless it comniands reasonable fees. The attorney fees fixed by the Leg'slature
as taxable costs in foreclosures are lower than such reasonable coinpensation, and the attorney must, unless he desires to give charity
to those who least need it, the moneyed- class, charge at least the
sums fixed by the fee schedule. If, because of past custom, he
allows his clients to dictate those fees, he is holding his profession
at too little worth.
The Committee on Internal Affairs, a euphemism for grievance
committee, again raises in its report the subject of its lack of disciplinary power. Possessing as we do a Bar Board endowed with
sufficient powers, and chosen from nominees of the Association, a
change in the functions of that board would seem of doubtful value.
I think, however, that the committee of the Association might well
serve, in somewhat more formal and active fashion than it now does,
as a kind of investigating magistrate, to hold an offender to the Bar
Board, which acts as a grand jury. It might well automatically,
instead of spasmodically, report direct to the Bar Board cases of
apparent professional misconduct which it has investigated. And
it is perhaps not going too far to suggest that the Bar Board might
make some use of the committee's investigations, instead of being
compelled in every case to go over the whole ground again. The
committee might also consider a public reprimand to the offender
in certain cases- The suggestion that the Secretary of the Association be made the secretary of the committee, and investigate minor
complaints which now take up the time of its chairman, is worthy
of consideration, and I am inclined to think is wise.
The suggestion has been made that the meetings of the Association be held in alternate years at a city on the Northern Pacific and
a city on the Great Northern, in order to afford the most convenient
opportunity for lawyers. from different parts.of the state to attend.
It is perhaps neither necessary nor desirable to have a fixed custom
in this respect, but the principle seems wise.
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There has been a tendency, which fortunately has not crystallized into a fixed custom, that the President and the meeting place
should bear some relation to each other. There are some obvious
advantages of convenience in this, but I believe it to be a vicious
tendency. It has resulted in most cases in depriving the attorney
from the small town, which has not the facilities for entertaining
the Association, of any hope of attaining the presidency. The men
whom our Association would delight to honor, and by whose election it would, honor itself, are by no means all in the larger places.
The lawyers from the small towns deserve their fair share of the
-honors, and I hope the Association will so bestow them more liberally than in the past.
In closing, may I thank you all, not only for the honor bestowed
and for the year which I have been privileged to spend in trying to
do a little for the advancement of the profession, and through it
for the interests of the public, but for the hearty cooperation which
has made the year so pleasant? It has been an experience never to
be forgotten, and has strengthened my admiration for the profession
to which we belong. May it always be a leader in working for the
public good, and hold high the torch of progress through the generations to come!
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CRIME PREVENTION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
HON. G. A. YOUNGQUIST
I think Judge Lewis has in mind the fact that I am a neighbor
of yours-in fact I started practicing law in the Red River Valley
in, Crookston, and I had at that time, and have since that, more or
less contact with North Dakota and its citizens and its lawyers, and
have, I. believe, retained a feeling of neighborliness and friendship,
which should, of course, exist between the citizens of one state and
the citizens of another.
I am not sure that the Judge is right in saying that he has chosen
quality this time rather than quantity. Of course I would not admit
that it is not possible for me to deliver the quality if I had the time
but the invitation came to me just a few days ago so
to prepare it,
I chose the biggest subject that I could think of -one in which I
could reach out in every direction and spread myself in whatever
channel that seemed to afford itself. That, you know, is what we
usually do when we have not the time for careful and accurate
preparation so I have chosen that tremendous subject-two tremendous subjects really-"Crime Prevention and Law Enforcement."
There is no crime wave. It is not, it seems to me, even a tidal
wave, because if it were after all a wave it would recede some time.
But the thing that we have stays with us, and more than that, it
keeps growing, so that what we have is a crime problem, and an
acute problem. It becomes so when we consider that we have in the
penitentiaries of this country about 100,000 men and women, and
approximately as many more in the jails and in the workhouses;.
that there are killed in this country every year 'by and through the
criminal acts of other nearly 10,000 human beings; that the direct
cost of crime is estimated at three billions of dollars, a cost of approximately $25 per capita for the entire population of this country,
and a total cost of thirteen, billion dollars a year. So there is every
reason why we should admit that we have a problem, and a real
problem, upon our hands; and as I said it is increasing. It is. In
1905 there were five human beings killed by and through homicide
out of every 100,000 of our population. In 1925, twenty years later,
there were nearly ten out of every 100,000 killed. That gives us
some idea of the extent of the rate at which crime has been increasing in this country.
It is interesting to note the numbers. I said there were about
10,000 homicides committed. The larger numbers occur in the
great centers of population and in certain sections of the East and
of the South.
Illinois, as we-might expect, with her several hundred gang murders in the last few years, leads in the statistics of 1.927 with 756
homicides. Next comes New York with 635. Then follow those
very populous states, Pennsylvania and Ohio with 550 each. After
these come the states with smaller population, but states located in
the extreme south, Alabama for instance, -with 526 homicides in a
single year; Florida with a population of about one million, with
485 a year and the States of Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky,
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Louisiana, all of them with more than 400 homicides in the year.
A rather striking contrast strikes the eye when we move to these
Northwestern states of ours. In Wisconsin, for instance, there
were that year 73 homicides; in Minnesota 65; in Iowa 59; Nebraska 48; South Dakota we have no figures from because that is
not included in the registration area; and from your own State of
North Dakota, there were only 11. It must be gratifying to you to
know that of the states reporting, 42 states I think it is, there are
only two states, Vermont and New Hampshire, that have a homicide
rate lower than yours.
With all of this before us, we cannot wonder that some months,
ago President Hoover said that the crime problem is the dominant
issue before the American. people, and that we are not suffering
from an ephemeral crime wave but from a subsidance of our foundations.
This tremendous quantity of crime and the increase in it has led
to something. It has led to the formation, in recent years, of not
less than ten national organizations who are either devoting themselves :exclusively, or devoting themselves in part, to the investiga-.
tion of crime.
I might mention them. First, of course, there is President
Hoover's National Law Enforcement Commission; another organized some four or five years ago, the National Crime Commission; the American Bar Association through its section upon Criminal Law, the American Law Institute, in its preparation of a new
code of criminal procedure; the American Institute of Criminal Law
and- Criminology; the American Psychiatric Association; the American Prison Association; the National Probation Society; the Social
Science Research Council, and last, but not least, the National Association of Credit Men, and besides these a great many states and
municipalities have had crime commissions and surveys.
Minnesota has had two in the last six years, and there has come
from the work of those commissions some legislation of real value.
The cost of crime to life and to property is so great that each state
can well afford to establish a permanent and continuing crime commission to make a constant investigation and survey of crime conditions within that state and recommend amendatory legislation, and
recommend as well action on the part of the duly constituted officers
and to arouse an intelligent public opinion that will operate on the
subject.
I have mentioned now the extent of crime. Logically we next
come to the cause of crime. Its causes, of course, are legion, and I
shall just skim over them, nothing more.
It was for many years a favorite theory that crime was largely
due to a subnormal mentality -because the tests taken in prisons by
psychologists show a rather low mentality. But that was before the
War; that was before the psychological tests taken of the four mil.lion men in the army proved that the mental level of the citizens of
this country was no lower than that, substantially speaking, of the
inmates of our penal institutions, so that with that evidence before
us, subnormal mentality loses almost all of its force as a cause of
crime. Naturally one of subnormal mentality is more easily led,
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and it may, in instances of that sort, contribute in part to a criminal
career, but it is not nearly so important as it once was thought to be.
Heredity-there is something in that, of course. But when you
stop to think of it, you seldom hear of a professional criminal who
has children. I happen to be a member of the Pardon Board in our
own state. We review every year hundreds of applications for pardon, but when we come to the application of the professional criminal, it is rare, if ever, that it be found that he has offspring. However, there are, no doubt, some children of criminals who have inherited criminal tendencies, but as a rule the majority of criminals
come from non-criminal families, so heredity is not the whole cause
by any means.
It has been thought, too, that economic pressure is in a large
measure responsible for crime but surveys of economic cycles of
depression and of prosperity prove nothing.
Recently we have thought, too, that the introduction into this
country of large numbers of foreigners has had to do with crime.
Undoubtedly it has, especially in criminal gangs such as we have in
Chicago -and other large centers of population, but I should not for a
moment want to be understood as saying, nor should I want anyone
else to say, that the foreign born generally are more prone to crime
than the native born, because I would be including myself in .that
classification.
It may be -true that prohibition has had something to do with the
increase of crime. President Hoover said in his address four
months ago that about eight per cent of the major crimes in this
country were traceable to the liquor traffic, which means, putting it
in other words, traceable indirectly at least to prohibition, but that
does not account for it all.
The jails as we conduct them now are in many instances schools
of crime, and that will continue to be so as long as we herd, together
the first offender whose mind is still open to reform and throw him
into contact with the confirmed criminal who is a past master in the
art and. who passes that art on to the young man in order that he
may make it his means of livelihood in the future.
Some judges have said, according to answers given to questionnaires, that love of adventure has a great deal to do with a man's
choosing a criminal career. It has, no doubt, something to do with
it, but I think that easy money and easy living without effort has
more to do with it than the love of adventure. There is prosperity,
generally speaking, on every hand, and if a man sees an opportunity
to share in that prosperity without labor he may, if he has a tendency in that direction at all, accomplish his end by stealing rather
than by earning
But after all, when we have considered all of these causes, there
remains what seems to me to be the prime cause of all-environment and home conditions. That is where the criminals are bred,
and that is where the upright citizens are bred, depending upon the
environment in which they live and the hc'me in which they grow
up.
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Investigations in Chicago show that the delinquency for each
one hundred boys living immediately adjoining the business district
in that city is seven or eight times as great as the delinquency per
hundred 6oys in districts five or six miles farther out. That is
environment. Fifty per cent of the delinquents brought before the
Juvenile Courts come from homes that have been broken up by
divorce, by drink, or by other causes. That it is true that the home
has more than anything else to do with the proclivity of boys and,
girls for criminal careers is proved by the fact that a recent survey
in the Sing Sing prison in New York shows that forty-five per cent
of the inmates were under twenty-five years of age.
Those three facts, it seems to me, point conclusively to this
other fact: that environment and home training have more to do
with the cause of crime and with the prevention of crime than has
anything else. And that brings us naturally to the preventative.
Of course, prevention, of crime is more important than cause or
prosecution or enforcement or anything else.
It is a truism to say that if all crime were prevented we would
have no crime. But all crime cannot of course be prevented; not
at least while you and I live. That millennium may come some
time in the future but not in our day.
I was interested this afternoon in hearing your President's excellent talk and his discussion of sterilization with respect to the
feeble-minded and the habitual criminals. It may interest you to
know that not less than nineteen states in our Union have adopted
laws to provide for the sterilization, in some cases, of the habitual
criminal, and in other cases-most cases-sterilization of the feebleminded, and that up to the first of last year some 8515 individuals
have been thus sterilized, and that in California, which has taken the
lead, there were 5820 of those. That will no doubt have its effect
in the future. The effect of it can be limited only, but nevertheless
important.
It will be argued by some that severe punishments will do much
to deter others from committing crimes. But we wonder whether
that is so when we recall the fact that not so very many years ago
there were not less than 200 offenses in England, many of them
minor in character, that Were punishable 'by death, and when we
remember that the juries, unwilling to sentence men to death for
minor offenses, found ways of acquitting them altogether. So that
cannot be the answer.
Sometimes in our day, punishments are quite too severe. We had
a case recently before our pardon board' where it appeared three
young men with previously good records had gone out one night and
held up five filling stations; that all three pleaded, guilty to robbery
in the first degree. They were sentenced under the law to a minimum of five years and a maximum of forty for each offense, which
meant that each of them had a minimum of thirty years to serve
and a maximum of 200 years. The Pardon Board in that case exercised, clemency to the extent of reducing the maximums so that
under the rules of the Parole Board the men might become eligible
to parole after twelve years. We thought that was a sufficient punishment for what really was a first offense, and that the Parole
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Board could parole them or retain them for the ninety years as they
chose.
We have another statute in Minnesota which subjects to life
imprisonment one who robs a bank in the daytime where there are
human beings in it-life imprisonment without an alternative, without any minimum. That means that one who robs a bank may, in
order to avoid identification or apprehension, kill .one or more of
the persons in it and he subjects himself to not one whit greater
punishment for one or several murders than lie does for holding
up the bank.
One of two things must be true: either murder should be punished more severely, or a bank robber should be punished less
severely. I disagreed with our Legislature when it abolished capital
punishment in our state. You have at least some measure of it
left, because here if one serving a life sentence commits murder,
he may be executed. In, Minnesota, the. lifer may commit murder
and suffer nothing.
There are, it seems to me, cases where the death penalty is not
too great and that it may be inflicted without brutalizing the officers
or the public and doing perfect justice. to the -criminal.
I have in mind one case occurring within the last six or eight
years just across the river, where a man brutally assaulted and then
killed -a girl and threw her body over the bridge into the river.
He had to be protected against the mob. He pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree. He was sentenced to prison for life. But
what.excuse can there be for such a man remaining alive? Or what
excuse can there be for the man, whoever he may be, that is guilty
of murder of the little Aune girl in Minneapolis? There are cases
where severity of sentence might well prove a deterrent to crime.
I think we might well let capital punishment be imposed in every
case of murder in the first degree by the jury, because no juror
would lightly assume the responsibility of sentencing a fellow being
to death.
We have these preventatives, these deterrents, but the one that
is most effective, it seems to me, so far as punishment goes, is the
swift and the sure apprehension and prosecution and conviction of
the criminal. While the improvement of the morals of the people
will, of course, most effectively remove the cause of crime, swift
and sure punishment is certainly the greatest deterrent that we can
devise at the present time.
The reduction of the loss of money in railroad robberies from
thirteen million dollars in the year 1920 to one million dollars last
year is undoubtedly due to the fact that in the last few years there
have been 97 convictions out of every 100 prosecutions for robberies of that sort. There is sure and certain punishment, with a
reduction in the amount of money stolen in that manner from thirteen million to one million dollars in a period of seven or eight
years.
I attended a psychology class in an extension course of our
University some years ago and I remember one of the tests that our
instructor gave us, worked out on ourselves as" it had been worked
on a great many others, was a choice, if we were contemplating the
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commission of a crime, whether we would do it in a jurisdiction
where the penalty was severe and the chances of apprehension and
conviction remote, or would, we do it in a jurisdiction where the
penalty was light and the chances of apprehension and conviction
great, and with us without exception, as we were told was true with
all others to whom the test had been given, the choice was the jurisdiction where the punishment was severe and the chances of conviction remote. Everybody is willing to take that chance, so the important thing becomes certainty of apprehension and conviction.
Another preventive measure that might well be adopted is a
system of laws- not only in the single state but in all the states in
conjunction, because only so can such a law be made effective,restricting the sale of firearms and making it an offense for anyone
to carry firearms without a permit.. In the period. between 1908
and 1916, of the crimes committed in Philadelphia 30 per cent involved the use of firearms.- In the following eight-year period the
percentage rose to 45 per cent. In the last two years the percentage
was 55 per cent. Of all the homicides, the 10,000 homicides committed in this country each, year, about 7000 are committed by the
use of firearms. Of course we cannot control it entirely but at least
we can diminish the number of firearms in the hands of irresponsible
persons, and a man who has not got a gun cannot shoot. If you
keep the gun away from him., he can't use it in the commission of
these crimes. The numbers in which, firearms are used indicates,
it seems to me, that if the sale of firearms is prohibited almost
entirely and the number of firearms in the hands of private citizens
reduced, there must necessarily follow some corresponding reduction in crime.
But after we consider all of these measures, we come back to
the proposition that the prevention of crime lies where the cause of
crime is.
In education in Americanization of the kind that your Bar Associaton here is doing, the Americanization of the natives as well as
of the foreign-born, and in the impi-vement of the home and the
social environment,-that is where the real prevention of crime
must lie in the last analysis.
I said I was speaking on Crime Prevention and Law Enforcement. Measured, by subjects, I am halfway through, and likewise
measured by time.
There can, of course, be no prosecution, there can be no enforcement of the law unless there be some individual to enforce it..
Like the old recipe for making rabbit pie, first catch the rabbit. So
here: before the criminal can be prosecuted, first we must catch the
criminal. I think that today, under present conditions which I shall
mention, the criminal apprehension arm of our government is the
weakest member of the administration of public justice. It is not
the fault necessarily of that branch of our government or of the
individuals who happen to occupy offices in it, but today criminals
are organized and crime is organized, as never before and criminals
are .daring and. learned. And they are more than that, they are
wise enough to employ counsel, not only for their defense but in a
case like this:
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Two men were in jail in Chicago. One of them after having
been there six hours was about to be freed. The other Said to him,
"How is it you get out so soon? I have been here four weeks and
I am still here." The one about to be released said, "You ought to
get a good lawyer. I have a lawyer to whom I report by telephone
every three hours, and if I don't report at the time when 1 should
he immediately gets out a writ of habeas corpus and looks me up
and then serves the writ on the jailer and gets me out." That was
his method.
Besides that, we know they have slush funds or defense funds
for their defense in case they are caught. And there is the transient. He is hard to find. In reading the newspapers of St. Paul,
I have been shocked at times to find that men arrested: as criminals,
committing serious crimes, live in the same neighborhood as I do.
You don't know where they are. You don't know where to find
them. Science has helped them with firearms and automobiles. The
government itself has helped with building roads on which to run
the automobiles in which they escape.
We have left our law enforcement practically in the horse and
buggy era, not because sheriffs are not equipped with automobiles,
but because there is no organization, within the country that can
possibly cope with crime that is not only state-wide but nation-wide
in its operation.
I drove this morning from your state line over here to Valley
City in an hour and a half. I hope I didnt violate any of your
speed laws. As against a criminal traveling a distance of sixty
miles in an hour and a half, 120 miles in three hours, where has a
local organization operating by itself in,endeavoring to detect, say
nothing of apprehend, a criminal, any chance? What we need is
organization on the part of the states.
We know that not all crimes are detected nor all criminals apprehended. Sometime ago former Governor Hadley of Missouri,
now chancellor of Washington University, submitted some statistics
relative to crime, and he said that in his opinion not more than ten
or fifteen per cent of those committing major crimes were apprehended and prosecuted, which means that between 85 and 90 critninals committing major crimes are not apprehended and prosecuted.
That shows the importance of strengthening the detecting and
apprehending part of our criminal machinery.
We had a recent experience in our state. We have a Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension. That Bureau was called down to one of
the southern counties for the purpose of investigating a murder.
The murder has not yet been solved, but that is neither here nor
there, for the purpose of this illustration. While out men were
down there making their investigation of that murder, they uncovered three carnal knowledge cases, one robbery, one conspiracy to.
murder, and one arson case, committed, some of them, as long as
two years and more ago, and the result is that thirteen individuals
are either in prison or on their way there. That came about by an
intensive survey and investigation of that county by skilled and
trained operators.
It is beyond the ability and beyond the facilities of the local peace
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officers to cope with crime at the present time. Whether there
should be a state police, such as Michigan and Pennsylvania and
some other states have, I don't know. We are trying an experiment
in Minnesota and we think it is going to work out. It is being tried
along the line that the state should, under present conditions, provide modern and scientific methods and train the local peace officers
in the use of those methods and direct their activities, and supplement those activities by trained men sent out by the State Bureau,
and then to gather information relating to the commission of crimes
in the state in order that there may be study and enlightenment ol
that phase of our activity. The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
of Minnesota, which happens to be under the charge of the Attorney
General, consists of the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent, who is also the fingerprint expert, a couple of clerks and eight
detectives or operatives. It is the duty of that Bureau under the
statute to collect fingerprints, photographs and Bertillion measurements of all those who are arrested in the state suspected of having
committed a felony or who are convicted of a felony. It is made
the duty of the chief of police of each city of the first class and of
each sheriff to send in information to the Bureau, and the duty of
the Bureau to tabulate it and to cooperate with other states in gathering together a mass of identification records. We have 41600
fingerprints collected so far.
It is also the duty of the Bureau to instruct the local peace
officers in their work, the detection of crime and the apprehension
of criminals. When a crime is committed it is the duty of the
Bureau to broadcast word of it in, order that the peace officers of
the state may be on their guard to apprehend the criminal. It is
the duty of the Bureau to gather information as to the commission
of crimes. All crimes discovered by a peace officer, or reported to
them, are required to be sent along to the Bureau, and in addition
to that it is contemplated that the modus operandi of the crime shall
also be reported.
I read some very interesting articles last year on the work of the
police of England, Germany and France. One outstanding thing
was what they called modus operandi. If a house was broken into
at a certain hour in a certain manner under certain circumstances
and sometime later another house was likewise broken into, they
would know both crimes were committed by the same man. They
were by this means often able to trace and apprehend the man who
had committed the criine. Even. that is included in the information
being gathered by our Bureau; but the most important function of
it, I think,. is one which, so far as I know, no other state has, and
that is that it has ready for immediate service, night or day, trained
operatives, who will go out on the call of any sheriff in the state and
assist him in investigating a crime or in catching the criminal. In
the first year of its existence the Bureau investigated 98 cases of
that sort, and the superintendent reports that as a result of those
investigations, in connection of course with the sheriff -or local
officer, there were 44 convictions. But in the last analysis we must
depend upon the local officers, it seems to me, beiause he is at home;
he is responsible for conditions in his own community, and he, more
than anyone else, can be made to feel that responsibility.
The city police are better manned and better equipped to police
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their areas. I think that the sheriff should "walk his beat" as the
policeman does. By that I mean he should make a survey of his
county, watch things to see what is going on, not only with respect
to major crimes, but with respect to misdemeanors as well, for if
professional gambling -be permitted, or liquor law violations or illegal
slot machines or anything else, it simply means they may lead to
larger crimes and to more serious problems.
I cannot forego mentioning, especially in this gathering of lawyers, the local prosecuting attorney, the state's attorney under your
system, the rural prosecuting attorney. I was one myself for four
years. He is the most important cog in the law enforcement machinery. He is the mainspring of the whole machine, and oftentimes the director and the supervisor, not only of 'the detection and
the apprehension of the criminal, but of the prosecution, of course.
As Raymond Moley, who did the principal work in the Missouri
Crime Survey, which has been adopted as a model by the National
Crime Commission, says, "The elective county prosecutor is pretty
much of an all-round man. The assistance he gets from the sheriff
and the coroner is unimportant and he must serve as lawyer, detective, scribe, and at times as pathologist and psychiatrist." He must,
of course, examine the witnesses and prepare his evidence. In most
of the European countries, all of that is done by the police and the
case is handed to him prepared for trial as in England the solicitor
prepares his case for the barrister.
Sometimes I have found' the prosecuting attorney must act not
only as such, and as a help to the sheriff, but as judge and jury too.
Permit me to relate one personal experience. That was back some
fourteen years ago. It was when saloons were still open in Minnesota. You know my county adjoins North Dakota, just opposite
Grand Forks county. I learned that there were gambling houses
operating on my side of the river. I employed a couple of detectives to have theni gather the necessary in-formation. One night
with the sheriff's force, we -descended upon -the t o gambling
houses. The sheriff, one of his deputies and I took one of them,
and three other men under the charge of a deputy took the other.
I remember as we walked up the stairs - it was on the second floor
and we got up there without the warning that was customarily given
-there, spread out before us, were eight or ten of these big poker
tables--I don't know whether any of you have seen them or notat the far end of the room a stud poker table, each table seated full
of men, and surrounded by another group of those who had gone
broke, no doubt; the air was.blue with smoke and profanity, to say
nothing of a number of drunks lying along the walls on either side.
After we had corraled them all, I went down and telephoned the
municipal judge. He was out of town. I 'telephoned the special
municipal judge and he said he would be down but he didn't come.
I learned later that he had stopped at the police station and found
out what it was all about. There we 'Were with 75 men on our hands.
Not knowing what to do with them, no room in the jail, I called
them tip before me, acting now as judge and jury, one by one, taking
their statements and taking their bail money-five dollars from each
one of the gamblers, and' if they didn't have that much we took what
they had-and $50 to $100 from the men who were dealing at the
tables, and ordered them all to report at 'the municipal court at ten
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o'clock the next morning. We went home that night with some
seven or eight hundred dollars in- bail money. I went back next
morning and attended municipal court at ten o'clock and the only
one of the 75 men that showed up, the only man of the lot who kept
his word, was a farmer from North Dakota. As I say, the prosecutor sometimes acts as judge and jury and as assistant to the
sheriff, but after all his job primarily is the prosecution.
We have had much criticism of the administration of criminal
justice. The Chief Justice of our national Supreme Court has called
it a disgrace. I think, however, that he had in mind more especially
conditions in the larger centers of population, because according to
my observation, not only in my state but in neighboring states, the
prosecution of crime is reasonably satisfactory, though not perfect
by any means. It depends upon two factors, .the man and the law.
We have been improving our laws constantly in late years. The
most recent thing that came to my notice was an amendment adopted
by the North Dakota Legislature this year of the law relating to
challenges in criminal cases, putting the state on -a parity with the
defense. Our L.egislature has not yet given us that. We are hoping
for it. We are expecting further equalization of chances between
the State and the defendant in the future.
There are, of course, a number of archaic forms in our criminal
procedure. The grand jury is one. You have not much of that
here. I understand under your statute you may file informations in
practically all cases. Under our statute, we may file them only
where the punishment does not exceed ten years. The grand jury
is an outworn institution really. It was organized by Henry II. for
the purpose of investigating crime. I think it was somewhere in the
twelfth centurv. Now the investigation of crime is, of course, made
by 'the state's attorney and the sheriff, and the grand jury merely
acts on what those officers present to it, and find, or fail to find, the
indictment accordingly. In fact, at one term in my county, the
grand jury found 122 indictments on facts I presented to them. The
next year they found at one term 120 indictments, all of which
might just as well have been presented to the court by means of an
information signed by the county attorney. It meant merely a matter of form. However, we have, as I say, some relief in that regard
in Minnesota now. An attempt was made to get the last Legislature to extend the class of offenses which could be presented by
information to include those punishable by twenty years' imprisonment, but did not succeed. We may get it yet. In fact, it is much
better it seems to me to leave the filing of a charge to an informed
and responsible public officer than to leave it to a body of untrained
men and women who sit for a day or two or three and have no
knowledge of the facts in the case brought before them except from
the brief statements of the witnesses presented -to them.
Some years ago, up -in the northern part of my state, I was presenting a matter to a grand jury, and at one stage in the proceeding, when a witness testified to something in favor of the man being
investigated, two or three jurors broke into applause. That is the
way they felt about investigating crime.
But I -must not take any more time except to mention just one
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or two things relating to procedure.
few are chosen.

I have many of them noted but

One is that we should have the right, by reciprocal legislation
between states, to compel a witness from one state to go to another
to testify in a criminal case there pending. By reason of the fact
that the Constitution requires that an. accused shall be confronted
by the witness against him,, the State cannot, as the defendant, take
depositions, but the witness must be personally present. A few
years ago I tried a case in western Minnesota where two young
women who had in their possession very valuable evidence left the
state, and when, I pleaded with them -to come back from South
Dakota just across the line into Minnesota to give that testimony
they refused, and we were helpless.
Just this year Louisiana adopted such a law, and other states in
the East have such laws.
One other thing I cannot forego mentioning, and that is
that there should be provided a separate pleading and a separate
trial of the issue of insanity. In a recent case, that is three or four
years ago, a murder case that I was engaged in, the defendant's
counsel did not know until after the State's case had been closed
whether they would offer evidence as to the insanity of the defendant, or whether they would not. The general plea of not guilty
puts in issue all of the allegations of the indictment and puts in
issue accordingly the sanity of the defendant. Not only has the
state no notice of what the defense is going to be, but what is more
important, the question of the sanity or insanity of the defendant
is not a fit subject for trial by a jury of laymen. The sanity or insanity of the defendant should not be mingled. with the facts relating
to guilt or innocence because that has nothing to do with guilt or
innocence. If a man be insane, he cannot be guilty, for he has committed no crime under the law. We have in mind a quite recent
case, the Remus case in Cincinnati. Every year or two years, we
have applications to the courts in Minnesota for the release of murderers who were acquitted two or three years before on the ground
of insanity. Now they 'have recovered; now they are ready to 'take
their places again in society.
I have covered, in a way, most of what I had in mind,, but after
all, after everything has been. said about the police and the sheriffs
and the prosecuting attorneys and the jurors and the judges, the fact
nevertheless remains that these are but the machinery which the
people have set up for themselves. They are the representatives
and the servants of the public and they cannot well do more than
the public demands of them, or the public asks that they do. Generally speaking, the law enforcement machinery gets -little help from
the outside. The citizen is prone to sit back and let the law enforcement officers get along as best they can. Of course crime in the
abstract is abhorred by every good- citizen. But when a man comes
into the toils of law, when a concrete case is presented, then much
of the abstract support which the prosecutor has vanishes and there
comes in its place a mistaken sympathy, a foolish and silly sentimentality, and if the accused, have friends, the prosecutor is urged to
let him off, or they may appeal to the court for leniency, to the parole
board or pardon board for clemency, and :if those appeals are not
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sufficient, sometimes political pressure is tried,--but I am glad to
say that political pressure seldom succeeds, at least out here in our
country. It is nevertheless true that the public hampers the prosecution with hindrances of one sort or another a dozen times where it
helps him once.
The public press is also a-very important factor in the administration of justice. It can. be of tremendous assistance, as much by
what it omits to do as by what it does. I have had experience with
a reporter sent out by a newspaper to cover a trial, a specialist in
"human interest" feature stories, a "sob sister" in the vernacular of
the press, to whom the merits of the case and the administration of
justice meant nothing at all, and the sensational and the sentimental
and the lurid meant everything. I have had experience, too, with
newspapers who have fairly and accurately and fully reported
crimes and criminal trials. They serve as educators of the public
and are an aid. I have no objection ,topublicity of criminal matters
in newspapers, but I think the newspapers owe it as a duty -to their
reading public and to the government. to not report a trial in which
the evidence is being presented in an,orderly fashion, and in which
the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction, not to report it in
such fashion that the state will appear an ogre in pursuit of the defendant, 'but let them show the thing in true proportions, whatever
that picture may be. Then it will be a -help rather than a hindrance.
The greatest aid, I"think, -to the solution of the crime problem
is a conscientious cooperation on the part of those who form the
respectable stratum of society, by a strict observance of the laws
that have been enacted, not only for their benefit, but for the benefit
of their fellow men as well, and a course of conduct on their part
that no one can construe as countenancing any violation., directly or
otherwise, of any of the laws. If the respectable portion of society
does not so conduct itself, we cannot well complain if the other
portion of society persists in lawlessness and crime.
An active and intelligent support of the administration of criminal justice, and a real respect for the law on the part of those who
have the intelligence and the strength of character to mold public
opinion is the best immediate remedy for the crime situation that I
know of.
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WHEN IS A GRAIN GAMBLER?
HON. W. H. STUTSMAN
It is with considerable trepidation that I respond, to President
Lewis' invitation to read a paper before this association and in doing
so discuss didactically the legal phases of a subject so complicated
as grain speculation; but I am somewhat sustained in my self conceit by the thought that it is a subject the North Dakota lawyer
does not often have occasion to delve into deeply, and hence that I
may be able to get away with it, and even, perchance, advance some
new idea-new to him, at any rate-and thus the more firmly
establish my already brilliant reputation for legal profundity.

In discussing the question whether a given business transaction
comes within the purview of a statute condemning certain conduct
as gambling, or within the denunciation of legal principles refusing
the aid of the courts to the enforcement of such transactions, let
us first direct our attention to the evil sought to be reached and
cured.. A bet, which is synonmyous with wager, is defined by
Bouvier to be:
An agreement that some valuable thing or sum of money in
contributing which all the parties take part, shall become
the property of some one or. more of them on the happening
of some event which is at present uncertain.
Wagers, in general, 'by the common law, were lawful contracts,
and in the time of Blackstone all wagers were recoverable which
were not made upon games, or which were not such as were likely
to disturb the public peace, or to encourage immorality, or such as
would probably affect the interests, characters and feelings of persons not parties to the wager, or such as 'were contrary to sound
policy or the general interests of the community. However, Blackstone 'tells us:
That taken, in any light gaming is an offense of the most
alarming nature, tending by. necessary consequence to promote public idleness, theft and debauchery among those of a
lower class; and among persons of superior rank it hath frequently been attended with the sudden ruin and desolation of
antient and opulent families, and abandoned. prostitution of
every principle of honor and virtue, and often hath ended
in self murder. That to restrain this pernicious vice among
,the inferior sort of. people, the -statute 33 Hen. VIII c. 9,
was made which prohibits to all but gentlemen the games
of tennis, tables, cards, dice, 'bowls, and other unlawful diversions therein specified, etc. (Book IV c. 15.)
Blackstone goes on. to denounce gaming in high. life and the beWail a passion:
Which we seem to have inherited from our ancestors the
antient Germans; whom Tacitus describes to 'have 'been bewitched with a spirit of play to a most exorbitant degree.
"They addict themselves" says he, "to dice -when sober, and
as a serious employment with such a mad desire of winning

BAR BRIEFS

or losing, that when stripped of everything else they will
stake at last their liberty, and their very selves." * * * One
would almost -be tempted to think Tacitus was describing
a modern Englishman.
He recites certain current statutes denouncing games, etc., and
adds;
But particular descriptions will ever be lame and deficient,
unless all games of.mere chance are at once prohibited; the
inventions of sharpers -being swifter than the punishment of
the law, which only hunts them from one device to another.
Blackstone's advice seems to have been acted upon, since 8 and
9 Vict. c. 109, sec. 18, altered the common law so as to make all
wagering contracts void, and this is now the law in this country.
In fact it will be found that in every instance it is the wagering
element, the staking of money upon a chance, pursuant to the desire
of winning something for nothing-or for very little-upon the
happening of an uncertain event which is denounced by legislatures
and courts and which is sought for in every suspicious or questionable transaction, whether in wheat, cotton or stocks, and the question
sought to be answered in each case is, were the parties staking their
money upon the happening of an uncertain event, in other words
"betting"?
While Tacitus has described not only the modern En'lishman
but also the modern American, so far as the mad desire for winning
is concerned, yet the modern American, whether he is a gentleman
or merely one of the inferior sort of people mentiond by Blackstone, is not content with games of mere chance; even if he is imbued
with such a mad) desire of "winning or losing" (though most prefer
to win only) that when stripped of everything else he would stake
at last his liberty, yet he insists upon mixing his skill, his knowledge,
his judgment, his foresight or his "hunch," with his other element
of "chance," so that he finds the roulette wheel, the horse race, the
poker table, the dancing dice too tame, and. insufficient and unsatisfactory for his purpose, and he casts about for some wagering
device which will permit him to exercise all these qualities of his,
and he finds the futures market-and especially the future grain
market-ready to his hand.
In the grain trade we find two sorts of transactions; the one
involves the purchase and sale of grain for immediate delivery, and
the other its purchase and sale for future delivery. The former we
speak of as cash sales and the latter as future trading, or merely
"futures." The future market grows legitimately out of the necessities of the grain trade. We need not stop here to consider what
these are further than to say that for the purpose of handling the
tremendous cropz of the west and northwest grain exchanges have
been established at Chicago, Minneapolis and other cities, in which
the members, acting as brokers for the producer and consumer alike,
have evolved, a highly complicated and intensely intricate, and yet
a well oiled and smoothly running, system of trading, whereby grain
is bought and sold for -future delivery according to certain fixed
rules and regulations. For convenience these contracts are made performable on any day of a certain future month and contemplate the
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delivery and acceptance of certain quantities of certain kinds and
qualities of grain at certain prices at the time fixed, for performance.
Owing to the flexibility of these contracts and the continued existence of a market for all classes of grain, neither the purchaser nor
the seller is compelled to await the arrival of the delivery day to
close out his transaction, for -he may go out into the open market
at any time and enter into a counter transaction which will wipe out
the one he has.
The futures market is extensively used by grain dealers, millers
and others for the purpose of hedging. This is an operation whereby a dealer, having purchased or contracted for grain, insures himself against loss by selling a future; a miller, to insure himself a
supply of grain at today's prices for future use, buys futures; a
warehouseman, having sold stored grain insures himself against loss
by buying futures; and so forth. These are all legitimate transactions involving the purchase or sale of actual grain. Yet the dealer
who has sold futures against the grain -he is shipping in from the
country does not deliver it under his futures contract but sells it in
the cash market and pulls in his hedge; the miller does not accept
delivery of his future to furnish grain for his mill but buys his grain
in the cash market and sells his future; the warehouseman does not
actually accept delivery of his future to furnish grain to redeem his
storage tickets with, but settles for them in cash and sells his future.
So in practice no grain is delivered even under future contracts
which are concededly 'bona fide deals in actual grain, but the trades
are offset against each other and the differences paid in cash. So
the gambler Who craves the excitement of staking his "wits" along
with his money goes into the futures market and, pretends to buy
and sell grain for future delivery, regardless of whether he needs
any grain, 'has any place to put' it or anything to pay for it with.
As regards the technique of the transaction there is no difference
between the betting of the gambler that wheat will go up-or (lown,
as the case may be-and the purchase or sale of actual grain by the
grain dealer. So it is easily perceived how splendidly the machinery
of future trading is fitted to the uses and purposes pf the gambler,
who can go through all the motions of buying grain without buying
any, of selling grain without selling any, merely paying his losses
or taking his gains when the deals are closed'.
But the gambler must not be confused with a third type of grain
operator known as the "speculator," of whom it must be conceded
there are very many in the grain trade, whose dealings involve
immense sums of money and vast quantities of mythical wheat, and
without whom the futures market admittedly would: be in dire
straights. His presence on the market is justified and defended by
the bona fide grain men themselves on the theory that his operations
tend to "broaden" the market and. to prevent rapid fluctuations of
prices and thus assist in the distribution of the crops by absorbing
the excess dkimped on the market at harvest time.
In this connection John G. McHugh, Secretary of the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, in a brochure entitled "Modern Grain
Exchanges," dated June 1, 1922, makes a clever- distinction between
speculation and gambling, which, while I do not find it referred to
by the'courts as a legal distinction, or as one of the criteria for
determining whether one-is betting on the price fluctuations of grain
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or not, should certainly have a bearing upon the economic question
whether the speculator is a curse or a benefit. He says:
There are many who consider that speculation and gambling are the same thing. The fact is that there is a marked
distinction between the two. Speculation consists of the assumption of a risk which already exists, and must be assumed
by some one. The risks assumed by fire insurance companies,
etc., are in fact, speculative risks. As a result of the study of a
vast number of cases, the insurance companies are able to estimate the risk with reasonable certainty, and to base their premiums upon these estimates. Speculation in grain in the same
manner is the assumption of the speculative risk connected
with the ownersh.ip of any kind of property. This risk already
exists, and must be assumed by some one, either by those
engaged in the actual distribution of the crop, or by a useful
class known as speculators. As the average merchant is unwilling to assume the risk of fire which might destroy his
property interests and prefers to shift his risk upon the fire
insurance company, so also those engaged in the grain and
milling business or in the manufacture of linseed oil prefer to
shift the speculative risk connected with the ownership of
grain, etc., to those who make a specialty of assuming these
risks, as do the fire insurance companies in assuming the fire
risk. * * * The speculator who is competent, financially and
educationally, to engage in this line of work is performing
precisely the same service that the fire insurance company
performs, which assumes fire hazard on property generally.
The gambler creates the risk for the purpose of assuming
it, and this risk, when created, performs no useful service,
whatever, and its assumption is wholly unnecessary. *The
customers of the proprietors of a gambling den, in playing
various games of chance, are assuming a risk which performs no useful service. The bets made upon 'horse races,
etc., are strictly gambling transactions, so, also, are the transactions in bucket shops, which are mere bets between the
proprietor and the customer. If the customer wins, the
proprietor loses, and the bucket shops are gambling dens of
the worst character.
However, Mr. McHugh goes on to distinguish 'between the
speculator who is competent and the one who is incompetent, justifying the existence .of the former only:
In all this we have considered speculation from the standpoint of those who are qualified financially and. educationally
to engage in this class of business, the same as the fire insurance companies are qualified financially and through wide experience to assume the fire risk. Unfortunately, a number of
individuals engage from time to time in speculation, both in
grain and. real estate, who are not justified, from any standpoint in assuming this risk. One of the greatest problems
which presents itself to the recognized grain exchanges is to
prevent these individuals from making use of the futures
market for speculative purposes. While it is true that the
speculative trades of these incompetent individuals, do in a
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small measure "broaden" the market, and assist in the distribution of the crop, still the injury inflicted upon these individuals by their losses is out of all proportion to the service
which their speculative trades perform in the crop distribution.
So it will be noted that even in modern times as well as "antient"
some games are meant only for gentlemen or those of the upper
classes, or in other words for the educationally and financially competent. But we must not make light of this distinction between the
competent and the incompetent speculator, for we have the authority
of the highest court in the land for it.
United States v. New York Coffee & Sugar Exchange, 44 Sup.
Ct. 225, 263 U. S. 611, 68 L. Ed. 475, was an attempt on the part
of the United States to enjoin the operation of the New York Sugar
Exchange as a conspiracy in restraint of trade, growing out of a
sensational fluctuation in the price of sugar in the spring of 1923.
The action failed for want of evidence to connect the management
of the Exchange with the disturbance in the market, 'but the court,
in passing, and speaking through Chief Justice Taft, made this
classification of future traders:
Those who 'have studied the economic effect of such exchanges for contracts for future deliveries generally agree
that they stabilize prices in the long run instead of promoting
their fluctuation. Those who (teal in futures are divided into
three classes; First, those who use them to hedge, i. e., to
insure themselves against loss by unfavorable changes in
price at the time of actual delivery of what they have to sell
or buy in their business; second, legitimate capitalists, who,
exercising their judgment as to the conditions, purchase or
sell for future delivery with a view of profit based on the law
of supply and demand; and third, gamblers or irresponsible
speculators, who btiy or sell as upon the turn of a card:.
In Board' of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236,
25 Sup. Ct. 637, 49 L. Ed. 1031, which was a bill by the Chicago
Board of Trade to enjoin certain alleged bucket shops from disseminating the board of trade quotations, the defense was urged
that plaintiff, itself, was the greatest of all bucket shops, and the
court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, said:.
Of course, in a modern market, contracts are not confined
to sales for immediate delivery. People will endeavor to
forecast the future, and to make agreements according to
their prophecy. Speculation of this kind by competent men
is the self adjustment of society to the probable. Its value is
well known as a means of avoiding or mitigating catastroplies, equalizing prices, and providing for periods of want.
It is true that the success of the strong induces imitation by
the 'weak, and that incompetent persons bring themselves to
ruin by undertaking to speculate in their turn. But legislatures and courts generally have recognized that the natural
evolutions of a complex society are to be touched only with a
very cautious hand, and that such coarse attempts at a remedy for the waste incident to every social function as a simple
prohibition and laws to stop its being are 'harmful and vain.
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Are we not then forced to make this distinction between speculation which is permissible and that which is not: that the educationally and financially qualified-that is to say, the person who makes a
sufficiently profound study of present and future market conditions
to be able to form and exercise a sound judgment and who is financially able to pay for the grain he 'buys-may assume this risk already created and which somebody must bear, and so buy and sell
futures with a view to profit based upon the law of supply and demand, without becoming a gambler? while the irresponsible speculator who buys and sells as upon the turn of a card, without any comprehension of the workings of the law of supply and demand, without any knowledge or study of market conditions, but in mere
imitation of the strong, is a gambler?
Of course, we must not lose sight of the fact that the decisive
test in determining whether in a given case one is gambling or trading legitimately is 'his intention. All future contracts on their face
import actual delivery, but notwithstanding this the parties may,
and often do, agree that no delivery shall take place but that they
will settle their deal by a payment of differences. In all such cases
the parties are merely betting upon the price fluctuations of the
commodity dealt in. But it must not be assumed that because in
actual practice -contracts are settled that way the parties had agreed
in all cases that there should be no delivery, and hence that they
were gambling. Any intention short of one not to deliver is inconsistent with any of our legal definitions of wagering, and unless
one harbors this definite intention not to deliver he is not gambling
no matter what he may think he is doing. As an illustration, in
Cleage v. Laidley, 149 F. 346, the defendant sought to escape liability by insisting that he did- not intend to receive the grain he had
bought 'but that he had intended to take and pay for that portion
which was forced upon him, and the Circuit Court of Appeals held
that he was not gambling.
In determining whether a futures contract is valid the court does
not merely seek to ascertain whether the intention was to deliver or
not, but it seeks to find out whether the possibility of delivery was
within the contemplation of the parties and, whether they were prepared for such a contingency. A' trader, knowing that in practice
he will not be called' upon to deliver or to accept delivery because
of the mechanics of the exchange which provide a method of offsetting contracts against each other, may not greatly concern himself
with the question whether he is going to deliver or not, but it is
vitally important that he have such a contingency in mind and. be
prepared to deliver or accept delivery in case it be required of him.
And this is the reason why a rich man might legitimately speculate
and a poor man not.
If Mr. Patten, with fifty years' experience in studying world
conditions in the grain business, after exhausting all means at hand
for estimating the present relationship of the supply to the demand
and the probable future fluctuations, concludes that wheat will be
higher next December and for the purpose of capitalizing this opinion decides to buy a million bushels of wheat for next December
delivery, he places his order with his broker to buy that amount for
him. He is reasonably sure that he will not be called upon to take
and pay for one million bushels of 'wheat but knows that in all

BAR BRIEFS

likelihood he can close out his contract according to the rules of
the Board of Trade whenever he feels that the price has gone as
high as it will. However, he knows all the time that such a thing
is possible as his being compelled to accept delivery whether he
wishes to or not and his contract was made with that understanding.
In other words when Mr. Patten made his contract he contemplated
two alternatives: one that delivery might be forced upon him and the
other that the contract might be settled by offset and the payment
of differences. So that the real test is that the parties must contemplate delivery, or the possibility of delivery. If a trader is without means this is very persuasive evidence that he did not contemplate even the possibility of delivery.
As illustrative of this proposition let us take two cases from
Iowa, decided not over a year apart by the same judges; First Nat.
Bank v. Oskaloosa Packing Co. 23 N. W. 25-5, involved a deal in
short ribs. The court, holding that the evidence sustained. a verdict
to the effect that the defendant was gambling, said:
It is very clearly shown * * * that he at no time intended
that the 700,000 pounds of short ribs should be delivered to
him and be paid for by him. His evidence is strongly corroborative of the fact that it was no part of the business of
the defendant to deal in options on the Chicago board of
trade. The transaction, if a valid one, involved the payment
of some $60,000 in performance of the contracts; and the
packing company had no assets except such as was invested
in its real estate, and the tools, implements and fixtures necessary to carry on its business.
Tomlin v. Callen, 28 N. W. 573, involved grain futures; the
court, hol ding that the illegality of the transaction was not shown,
said:
It is a matter of 'general information that many ostensible
transactions in grain are of a purely gambling and criminal
character. The widespread' ruin produced show them to be
among the greatest of evils. Where their true character is
discovered, courts should promptly condemn them, and hold
them void. But they need to proceed with caution. In the
movement of the grain of the country, contracts for future
delivery are, to some extent, a necessity, and they are as
legitimate as any other; and that, too, though the parties
may contemplate the possibility of a settlement by payment
of differences.
Nowhere is this proposition more clearly set forth than in a
North Dakota case, John Miller Co. v. Klovstad-, 14 N. D. 435,
105 N. W. 164, where Judge Fisk, then a district judge sitting -by
request on the supreme court, in a situation where the defendant
was clearly hedging but as he did not understand the technique of
hedging. he suffered heavy losses and when sued for the advances
made claimed he was gambling, wrote the decision of the court,
saying inter alia:
The fact that the broker adjusts the two transactions
through the clearing house by offsetting one against the other,-
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instead of going through the formality of making and exacting a delivery of the actual grain, does not show the transaction to be a mere gambling one. The test is, did the parties
have the legal right to demand and receive or deliver the
actual wheat, or did they contemplate and agree that no
actual wheat should be delivered? What the parties may
have done, or what they may -have contemplated doing in the
matter of delivery of actual grain, is not controlling, but,
rather, what they believed and contemplated they had. a legal
right to do under the cortract in this regard, is the test.
Any other rule would greatly hamper the millions of legitimate transactions taking place every week in the business
world, and would do away with the great convenience of the
clearing house. The essence of a gambling transaction is that
the particular transaction shall contemplate no delivery, without reference to making of any other deal. * * * If an order
to sell for future delivery is a gambling deal merely because
the seller contemplates that he will later on buy the grain to
fill the order, then "hedging" is impossible, and practically
every trade on the boards of trade in the country is illegal.
* * *' The fact that one of the parties may intend that, in
lieu of a delivery or acceptance of the grain, he may later
on make a counter trade and offset the two legal contracts
against each other will not operate to invalidate the transaction.
In the Christie case (supra) the United States Supreme Court
says:
The fact that contracts are satisfied in this way by set off
and the payment of differences detracts in no degree from the
good faith of the parties and if the parties know, when they
make such contracts that they are likely to have a chance to
satisfy them in that way, and intend to make use of it, that
fact is perfectly consistent with a serious business purpose,
and an intent that the contract shall mean what it says.
* * * It is no less a serious business contract for a legiti.mate and useful purpose that it may be offset before the time
of delivery in case delivery should not be needed or desired.
Purchases made with the understanding that the contract will
be settled by paying the differences between the contract and
the market price at a certain time stand on different ground
from the purchases made merely with the expectation that
they will be satisfied by set off.
proportion of the legitimate to the
Speaking further upon the
says:
illegal deals, the same court
No more does the fact that the contracts -thus disposed of
call for many times the total receipts of grain in Chicago. The
fact that they can be and are set off sufficiently explains the
possibility, which is no more wonderful than the enormous
disproportion between the currency of the country and contracts for payment of money, many of which in like manner
are set off in clearing houses without any one dreaming that
they are not paid, and for the rest of which the same money
suffices in succession, the less being needed the more rapid
the circulation is..
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Having shown the legal distinction between gambling and legitimate speculation, let us now approach the problem of telling them
apart as a fact question. It must be held in mind that practically all
of the cases in which this question arises are actions between 'brokers and their principals involving advancements and commissions,
and the principal is permitted to testify that his purpose was to
gamble and to make no deliveries. The principle of law laid down
in these cases therefore has to do with the intention to deliver, and
vary infrequently with the distinction between an intention not to
deliver and the contemplation of a possibility that a delivery might
not be necessary, but seldom, if ever, do these cases exclude the idea
that such a deviation from an intention not to deliver would make
the.transaction legitimate. However, a wide lack of knowledge of
the mechanics of -future trading, on the. part of many judges is disclosed in their attempts to establish criteria by which to determine
the gambling character of the transaction, and many state courts,
not unaffected by the popular distrust of future markets, have unduly stressed circumstances which actually have no bearing on the
question; their suspicions being excited 'by the very rules laid down
by the exchanges in their efforts to restrict and prevent illegal trading. We need not leave our own state to find a striking example.
In Dows v. Glaspell, 4 N. D. 251, 60 N. W. 60, Judge Corliss excoriated the grain gambler and. the brokers in true swashbuckler
style, saying:
Illegality is seldom guilty of the consummate folly of
flaunting its defiance of law in the face of public sentimentof furnishing itself the evidence of its violation of law. To
escape the penalties of breaking the law, it will always put
on the "suits and' trappings" of honest transactions. Mere
wagering contracts invariably wear the garb of bona fide
sales. This is common knowledge. Myriads of gambling
operations are daily arranged' by two interested brokers, who
fatten on the folly of their dupes, in the decent and decorous
habiliments of lawful business transactions. The naivete of
a tribunal which in such cases should unquestionably take the
semblance for the substance would, indeed, be pitiable, if it
did not excite derision and contempt.
In this case the correspondence showed conclusively the defendant, "an attorney in full practice," was gambling to his broker's
knowledge, and the foregoing tirade was perhaps justified, but many
circumstances consistent with either an 'honest or an illegal purpose,
and therefore of no importance either way as proof, were dragged
forth as evidence to show defendant was gambling, one of which to
our mind was uncalled for. One of the rules of the Duluth Board
of Trade was that the party selling should deliver the property
sold at the time specified, "unless the purchaser shall consent to
accept or pay the difference in cash, when so requested, by the seller.
In all cases, however, the buyer shall 'have the right to demand the
property, if.he elects,"-a rule entirely consistent with legitimate
trading, as, if the'parties intended to gamble and not to require
delivery, neither of them could invoke this rule, but Judge Corliss
says:
This rule-confirms our views that these transactions were
known by the plaintiff to 'be mere -wagering deals. * * *
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With the obvious purpose of covering up the gambling character of these operations, they establish a rule that there shall
be a delivery unless both parties agree to dispense with it;
knowing that both parties will always so agree.
In his criticism Judge Corliss fails to distinguish between an
agreement made at the time the future contract is entered into and
one made when it is about to be performed.
In Benson-Stabeck Co. v. Reservation Farmer's Grain Co. 205
P. 651, the supreme court of Montana held that the expression of a
fear on the part 9 f the commission firm that delivery would be
forced upon them, was a circumstance which the jury could consider. This was error. The very fact that delivery might be forced
on the buyer was proof positive that he -was not gambling, for if he
was he could not be compelled to take delivery. In this case the
danger was obviated -by switching the trade to a later month, which
is always done when the delivery date arrives too soon. The
"switch" may involve either a -loss or a gain, notbecause the trader
is gambling, but because of the spread between the quotations of
the two months, which has nothing to do with any intention to
gamble on his part, but which renders it impossible to make a new
hedge excepting upon .the new price. Hence, though the trader
might make a profit or suffer a loss as a result of the "switch," this
would not indicate that he Was gambling. .
Many other-cases could be cited to show a judicial tendency to
regard the most ordinary and consistent conduct of the legitimate
trader as evidence of a gambling intent, and to forget that grain
exchanges are perfectly legal institutions operating according to
rules and regulations approved -by the lawmaking bodies, and conducting their business in the legitimate performance of a highly
imuortant public function, but the foregoing will suffice.
The burden of proof is always on the parties asserting illegality
and it is for them to show this notwithstanding the episode is
clothed in the "decent and decorous habiliments of lawful business
transactions."
The question, of course, is to be answered, by a study of all the
surrounding circumstances, and to justify findings, in the absence
of admissions of the parties, that a transaction is illegal, the facts
must be out of the ordinary, that is, inconsistent with a lawful
purpose; a very slight deviation from the straight and,narrow path
may, however, prove sufficient to condemn the transaction. For
instance, in James v. Clement, 223 F. 754, 95 C. C. A. 186, the
broker wrote his principal to buy cotton on breaks in the market
and to sell on bulges in the market, and, stated that the conditions
made the market a good, "scalp." In Dows v. Glaspell (supra) the
broker wrote: "We are yery glad you had the pluck to hold on and
believe that wheat is a purchase on all good breaks. Still, if you
can get a good profit, we would advise you to close it out, taking
chances of getting it back at cheaper figures." In Rogers v. Harricourt, (Neb.) 82 N. W. 21, the broker wrote: "The bears appear
to have control of the market atthe present time and will undoubtedly force prices lower next. week, as everything appears to favor
them at present * * * while we think the market may: react, pos.-
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sibly enough to let you out, we have not got as much confidence
as you appear to have." These, of course, are merely "come on"
letters designed to encourage the trader in his intention to gamble,
and can be counted on to evidence knowledge of that intention.
Maintenance by the broker of an "exchange" to enable persons
to watch the stock market, telephone communication between living
rooms in the 'hotel, where there was a "ticker," and a broker's
office, and receipts showing the intention of a party to a stock contract, may be considered, say the court in Ballon v. Willey, 62 N. E.
1064, 180 Mass. 562, if unexplained, as being trade tools or appliances, justifying the same inferences of violation of law by the
making of wagering contracts as are drawn in another class of
cases from the use of beer pumps, or the possession of liquor
glasses containing heeltaps.
Moreover, even apparently legitimate conduct sometimes becomes out of the ordinary, and courts permit appropriate deductions to be made from them. While the closing out of the transaction before the time for delivery is a common, if not universal practice (excepting in case of a "switch" to a subsequent month) consistent with legality (though at least one state-Massachusettsmakes this action prima facie proof of intent not to deliver) yet the
supreme court of South Dakota, in Farmers' Elevator Co. v. QuinnShepherd-son, 199 N. W. 201, remarked:
It would seem that when the parties entered into a series
of transactions in futures, intending at the time the transactions were made to deliver actual grain and then changed
their minds some seventy times in closing out these transac-.
tions on the board of trade rather than delivering any actual
grain, that in itself ought to be strong evidence of what the
parties intended to do in the first place.
There was other overwhelming evidence in this case that the
trader was gambling-and that the broker knew it; in fact, in practically all of the cases where these apparently fictitious compliances
with rules consistent either with gambling or legitimate trading, are
animadverted to by the court to emphasize the nature of the
gambling transaction, there was sufficient other proof to make it
gambling anyway; such as lack of financial strength which we shall
discuss later.
In Biedler, etc. v. Coe Comm. Co. 102 N. W. 880, the supreme
court of North Dakota says:
Where there were no deliveries in numerous other trades
and deliveries were the exception, and settlements upon the
basis of market quotations the rule, it is not too much to require a party claiming rights under it to make it satisfactorily
and affirmatively appear that the contract was made with an
actual view to the delivery and receipt of the grain.
In this case 50 trades were made without a single delivery, and
no deliveries were made by the broker in any other trades at that
point.
But the most striking and decisive test is whether the parties are
financially able to make or accept delivery, if demanded or tendered.
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Parties to these transactions may comply with all the rules and
regulations of the exchange, may react properly to all the other tests,
may even be engaged in the grain business, but if the large quantities of the grain traded in are out of all proportion to the ability
of the trader to pay for, this is regarded as a strong circumstance
throwing the transaction out of the ordinary--and tends to sustain
the contention that only persons of means, those financially competent, should be permitted to deal in futures upon margins.
In the Quinn-Shepherdson case (supra) the manager of a small
country elevator, which had, handled less than 100,000 bushels of
wheat bought.265,000 bushels for future delivery in some 70 trades,
closing them all out before maturity.
In Atwater v. Manville (Wis.) 81 N. W. 985, the defendant had
no means whatever, and yet in a period of four months, he made
300 trades, involving eight million bushels of wheat, 80,000 bushels
of corn, one million pounds of short ribs, and $20,000 worth of lard.
In Rogers v. Merriott (supra) the court, after stating the defendant 'was scarce able financially to comply with plaintiff's demand for margins on a slight decline in the market, said: "To entertain the belief that he was able to pay at the current price for 20,000
bushels of wheat is simply preposterous. * * * Plaintiffs appear
to be in no wise concerned as to the intention or ability of defendant
to receive or pay for the commodity at the time it is deliverable."
In Watt .v. Wickershal, 43 N. W. 259, involving a transaction
in a small Nebraska town, the supreme court, comparing this case
with Sprague v. Warren, 41 N. W. 1113, involving a clerk in a
store, said: "In both cases the defendants were men whose residence, business, avocation and employment were such as to give
notice to the person dealing or coming in contact in business relations with them that any purchases or sales which they might make,
or desire to make, of grain or pork on the board of trade of Chicago,
were mere wagers on the fluctuations in the value of such products."
The supreme court of Pennsylvania, in Kirkpatrick v. Bonsal,
72 Pa. St. 155, says:
The "difference" requires the ownership of only a few hundred dollars, while the capital to complete the actual purchase
or sale may be hundreds of thousands of dollars. Hence ventures upon prices invite men of small means to enter into
transactions far beyond their capital, which they do not intend
to fulfill, and thus the apparent business in the particular
trade is inflated and unreal, and, like a bubble, needs only to
be pricked to disappear, often carrying down the bona fide
dealer in the collapse. Such transactions are destructive to
good morals and fair dealing and the best interests of the
community.
In Fagg v. Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq. 219, the decision turned upon
the enormous disproportion between the extent of the transactions
and the cash margin deposited, and the fact that the purchases were
known to the brokers to be far beyond their customer's pecuniary
ability.
There are certain types of transactions which stamp themselves
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as gambling without turther proof, and with these, of course, we
do not concern ourselves. Puts and calls are specifically denounced
by the statutes of Illinois and are 'held to be gambling ipso facto
by all the courts and have been done away with by nearly all grain
exchanges. Corners are unlawful as are all transactions tending to
create or sustain them. Scalping is recognized-as gambling, if for
no other reason than because the fact that there is not time for
delivery proves conclusively that delivery of no sort was in the contemplation of the parties. Stop loss orders are regarded, as proof of
intention to gamble though this is not necessarily always the case.
The bucket shop, of course, is a gambling device, pure and simplethe operator of the bucket shop merely bets with you as to what the
future price will be. He steals the quotations from the regular
exchanges and these decide the bets.
It 'has been my purpose here merely to examine into the legal
aspects of grain speculation and not to indulge -in a discussion of
the moral, ethical or economic phases of the subject. At that I have
no brief for the speculator,. rich or poor, educated or ignorant, but
a somewhat profound study of the decisions impels me to the conclusion that courts, legislatures and even the lay public are disposed
unjustly to impute to the practice of future trading the blame and
responsibility for the evils and abuses that grow out of it, rather
than to the persons who make use of the machinery of the futures
market for their illegal ends; and that the remedy for these abuses
lies not in prohibiting future trading, nor, in fact, in making intention to deliver the sine quo non of a valid .futures contract, but to
treat speculation by the competent as a legitimate occupation, and,
to hedge it about with restrictions and penalties that will effect the
exclusion of the financially unfit: the tin-horn gambler, the orner
drug clerk, the barber shop hanger-on and even the impatient disciple of Blackstone, eager -for the immediate realization of his fond
financial hopes and unable to endure stoically the tedium of waiting
for the tardy incoming of his golden'argosy.
In a recent issue of the Literary Digest I find this witty differentiation between gambling and speculation:
If you bet on three kings, that's gambling;
If you bet you can make three spades, that's entertainment;
If you bet wheat will go up, that's big business.
There is sound philosophy in this statement, though it may not
always turn out to be hilarious entertainment to make three spades;
but if we can succeed in permitting only those capable of engaging
in big business to bet wheat will go up, perhaps we will have solved
the farm relief problem now bothering our statesmen.

BAR BRIEFS

SOME ASPECTS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE LAW
HON. PHILTP

R.

BANGS

In the legal protection of women, we are at the crossroads, and,
by what has been done, and what has been accomplished, we must
now decide whether to continue to legislate for women or to treat
them the same as men.
In discussing this question, I am going to confine my remarks to
the Minimum Wage Law, insofar as it applies to adult women workers, of which type of legislation, commencing with the Massachusetts Act in 1912, only fifteen States and the District of Columbia
and Porto Rico have passed laws.
The first question that comes to one's mind, is why did it become so necessary, commencing in 1912, to provide a minimum wage
for women workers, when we realize that in 1880, one in seven
women were workers, and in 1920, there had only been about a
seven per cent-increase, making about one in five women workers
in 1920; also when we realize that in 1920 only about 21 per cent
of the women were workers while 78 per cent of the men were
workers, and, when I use the term "workers" I mean those gainfully occupied.
What was it that directed the attention of the people generally
to the women, rather than the men? What was it that caused legislation to be enacted, for the benefit of women, rather than for men?
There had been no such influx of women into industry, to cause
any particular agitation on that score, in fact statistics show that
even during the War, when the men were drawn into service, there
was no particular increase in the number of women workers, but
rather during that period of time, there was a shifting of groups
and women who formerly had been following domestic, personal
service, and, agricultural pursuits, left them and went into factories,
offices, the professions, trades, etc.
What actually happened, was that along about 1900, considerable was said by writers and others regarding the cost of living for
a family of five and what was absolutely necessary in order to
actually provide for such a family and what was necessary in order
that the family might have a few advantages and comforts, and
data was gathered together to show that the wages paid in many
cases did not afford, an adequate living, according to the standards
fixed. This interest in wages and cost of living was aroused by
reason of the increase in the retail prices, which between 1900 and
1910 rose about 25 per cent and as the wages did not increase immediately, this caused some suffering among the working classes.
This condition affected the men as well as the women but by
reason of agitation against the exploiting of women in sweat-shops
and factories and the stirring up of the public sentiment over the
condition of women in industry, the attention of the public was
focused on the women and that is one reason why the legislation
that sprung up about that time, was for the benefit of the women,
rather than the men.
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There was still another reason why Minimum Wage Laws were
urged and that was on account of the inequality of wages between
women and men. No one apparently stopped to think why tiere
was this difference in wages, and many, without thinking, urged'
that a women should receive the same wage as a man. There is no
question but that the average wage per week, for all women ii less
than the average wage for all men. In fact, there is a difference Gf
about 5.5 per cent, but it must be borne in mind that much of the
skilled work for which high wages are paid, can only be done by
men; that there are many more skilled laborers among the men than
there are among the women; that women have home duties that
interfere with their work; that on account of marriage, etc., their
duration of employment is uncertain; that there is more illness
among the women workers than among the men workers; that a
great deal of the work for women is seasonal and necessarily fluctu-ates and lastly, that women will actually work for less than men.
This, wage inequality cannot be eliminated, by the signing of a
legislative enactment. The remedy is not so simple. When women
do the same work and the same character of work that the men do,
with the same certainty of tenure and with the same degree of skill,
then they will be entitled to the same wage, but until then, no
amount of 'legislating on minimum wages is going to obtain for the
women a man's wage.
There was one other thing that contributed to the enactment
of minimum wage laws and that was the knowledge on the part of
those who were urging the passage of such laws, that a minimum
wage law was in violation of the right of freedom of contract guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States and that there
was only one feasible way of getting around the Constitution and
that was by making the law come within the police-power of the
state and with that in mind, the laws were enacted for *the women,
on the theory that by reason of their condition in life and physical
makeup, they required legal protection to safeguard their lives,
health and morals. Just why there is any distinction made between
men and women as to what they require for their health, is hard.
to see. They both certainly require the same necessities of life.
Nor is there any grounds for the distinction between men and
women, as to safeguarding their morals, for they are exposed to
similar, if not identical temptations.
There were a few writers who at the beginning, realized that
there was no real difference between men and women, at least none
that would warrant the passage of a Minimum Wage Law in favor
of one and not the other and these writers expressed the opinion
that possibly the obstacle of the United States Constitution could be
overcome, by declaring that all employment of 'both men and women,
was affected with a public interest and -therefore warranted the passage of special legislation, but no one seems to have quite had the
nerve to very seriously advocate such a thing, but many were found
willing to promote legislation in favor of the women and much
public sentiment was aroused in their behalf.
Practically all that has been written on this question, has been
written by persons who were prejudiced in favor of Minimum
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Wage Laws, or by social workers, who distorted facts and saw only
that which they wanted to see and forgot the rest.
Statistics and logical thinking quickly disproves the arguments
made in favor of minimum wages and, show to thinking people that
the principle is fallacious and that the laws will not accomplish
the object sought.
In 1880 there were 14.7 per cent of the women of the country
employed in gainful occupations, as compared, with 78.7 per cent of
the men. There was a continual increase in both the women and
men until 1910, when the peak was reached, with 23.4 per cent of
the women employed and 81.3 per cent of the men and in 1920, the
women had fallen to 21.1 per cent and the men to 78.2 per cent.
In other words, there was a greater proportion of women employed
just prior to the enactment of minimum wage laws than several
years after.
The bulk of the women employed, were between the ages
of sixteen and forty-four years old and of all the women employed
in 1920, one in four of them were married women and of all the
married women in the country, 9 per cent or one in eleven, were
employed in some gainful occupation and according to the best
information obtainable, the employment of married women has
materially increased since 1920.
No one can probably definitely fix the causes of all these things,
but one reason for the employment of married women and also the
employment of younger women, is on account of the inadequacy of
the wages of the family man to cover the cost of living, which has
increased something like 70 per cent between 1915 and 1920, while
wages throughout the country had only increased about 40 per cent.
Then too, it's the trend of the times, for women to -work now and
to try to do those things that were formerly left for men to do.
This difference between prices and wages was not of .any permanent nature however but was caused merely by the inability of
the wage scale to adjust itself immediately to the rise in prices,
however, commencing in 1918, wages started to go up and. after
1920, the wage level reached the price level and there is now no such
difference as there was in 1920. This adjustment, however, cannot
in any way be credited to the Minimum Wage Laws, because it was
general throughout the country and there were only fifteen States
that had any minimum wage legislation.
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of Adkins vs. Children's, Hospital, 261 U. S. 525; 67
Lawyers Ed. 785, decided by the Supreme Court on April 9, 1923,
fifteen States and the'District of Columbia and Porto Rico had
enacted Minimum Wage Laws and some of the State Courts had
upheld the validity of such laws, on the theory that it was a proper

exercise of the police-power of the state, in protecting and safeguarding the lives, health and morals of the women.

I am not going to attempt to define the term "police-power," for
text-writers and Courts have been engaged in that pastime for
many, many years and no definition has yet been given, that satisfied everyone, but generally speaking, police-power is another name
for that portion of the sovereignty of the state not surrendered to
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the Federal Government and it is the cloak behind which the Courts
hide when on account of public opinion, they want to uphold a law
which they know violates the Federal Constitution.
During this period of time, when there was such a wide range
of difference between prices and wages, minimum wage legislation
was enacted and public sentiment ankd opinion demanded that such
legislation should be upheld and so the State Courts, swayed and
influenced by this public sentiment, brushed aside all such obstacles
as the Constitution of the United States and declared that Minimum
Wage Laws which fixed a minimum wage for women empfoyees.
were valid -under the police-power of the State.
Those people who were advocating these laws and the members
of the Courts that upheld them, knew or must have known, that if
such laws had !been enacted for men, they would have been very
promptly declared unconstitutional, but they all followed the dictates of public opinion and announced as facts, their conclusions,
that by reason of the labor conditions and. physical characteristics
of women, it was necessary for them to have the protection of minimum wage laws, in order to safeguard their lives, health and morals.
I am not now speaking of those laws which fix sanitary conditions
or hours of labor but I am referring only to those laws, or the parts
of thcse laws, that have to do with the fixing of a mininum wage
for women.
It remained for the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
well considered case of Adkins vs. Children's Hospital, cited above,
to call a halt on this type of legislation and Justice Sutherland, in a
strong opinion, speaking on behalf of a majority of the Court, held
that a Minimum Wage Law of the District of Columbia, was in
contravention of the Constitution of the United States and not a
valid exercise of the police-power and therefore invalid, and in
connection with the argument that the law was a valid *exercise of
the police-power, to protect the health and morals of women, Justice
Sutherland made some very pertinent remarks, such as: "What is
sufficient to supply the necessary costs of living for'a woman worker
and maintain her in good health and protect her morals, is obviously
not a precise or unvarying sum, not even approximately so. The
amount would depend upon a variety of circumstances: The individual temperament, habits of thrift, care, ability to -buy necessaries
intelligently, and whether the woman lives alone or with her family.
To those who practice economy, a given sum will afford comforts
while to those of contrary habits, the same sum will be wholly inadequate. The cooperative economies of the family group are not
taken into account though they constitute an important consideration in estimating the cost of living, for it is obvious that the individual expense will be less in the case of a member of a family than
in the case of one living alone. The relation between earnings and
morals is not capable of standardization. It cannot be shown that
well-paid women safeguard their morals more carefully than those
who are poorly paid. Morality rests upon other considerations than
wages; and there is certainly no such prevalent connection between
the two, as to justify a 'broad attempt to adjust the latter with reference to the former. As a means of safeguarding the morals, the
attempted classification, in our opinion, is without reasonable basis.
No distinction can be made between women who work for others
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and those who do not; nor is there grounds for distinction between
women and men; for certainly if women require a minimum wage
to preserve their morals, men require it to preserve their honesty.
The feature of this statute which perhaps more than any other,
puts upon it the stamp of invalidity, is that it exacts from the employer an arbitrary payment for a purpose and upon a basis having
no casual connection with his business, or the contract, or the work
the employee engages to do. The declared basis, as already pointed
out, is not the value of the service rendered, but the extraneous
circumstance that the employee needs to get a prescribed sum of
money to insure her subsistence, health, and morals. The ethical
right of every worker, man or woman, to a living wage, may ,be conceded. One of the declared and important purposes of trade organizations is to secure it. And with that principle and with every
legitimate effort to realize it in fact, no one can quarrel; but the
fallacy of the proposed method of attaining it is that it assumes that
every employer is bound, at all events, to furnish it. The moral
requirement, implicit in every contract of employment, namely, that
the amount to be paid and, the service to be rendered shall bear to
each other some relation of just equivalence, is completely ignored.
The necessities of the employee are alone considered, and these arise
outside of the employment and are the same when there is no employment, and as great in one occupation as in another. Certainly
the employer, by paying a fair equivalent for the service rendered,
though not sufficient to support the employee, has neither caused
nor contributed to her poverty. On the contrary, to the extent of
what he pays, he has relieved it. In principle, there can be no difference between the case of selling labor and; the case of selling
goods. If one goes to the butcher, the baker, or grocer, to buy food,
he is morally entitled to obtaixi the worth of his money, but he is
not entitled to more. If what he gets is worth what he pays, he is
not justified in demanding more simply because he needs more; and
the shopkeeper, having dealt fairly and honestly in that transaction;
is not concerned in any peculiar sense with the question of his customer's necessities. Should a statute undertake to vest in a commission, power to determine the quantity of food necessary for individual support, and require the shopkeeper, if he sell to the individual at all, to furnish that quantity at not more than a fixed maximum. it would undoubtedly fall before the constitutional test. The
fallacy of any argument in support of the validity of such a statute
would be quickly exposed. The argument in support of that now
being considered is equally fallacious, though the weakness of it
may not be so plain. A statute requiring an employer to pay in
money, to pay at prescribed and, regular intervals, to pay the value
of the services rendered, even to pay with fair relation to the extent
of the benefit obtained from the service, would be understandable.
But a statute which prescribes payment without regard to any of
these things, and solely with relation to circumstances apart from
the contract of employment, the business affected by it, and the work
done under it, is so clearly the product of a naked, arbitrary exercise
of power, that it cannot be allowed to stand under the Constitution
of the United States.
Finally, it may be said that if, in, the interest of the public welfare, the police-power may be invoked to justify the fixing of a
minimum wage, it may, when the public welfare is thought to
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require it, be invoked to justify a maximum wage. The power to
fix high wages connotes, by like course of reasoning, the power to
fix low wages. If, in the face of the guaranties of the 5th Amendment, this form of legisatioln shall be legally justified, the field for
the operation of the police-power will have been widened to a great
and dangerous degree. If, for example, in the opinion of future
lawmakers, wages in the building trades shall become so high as
to preclude people of ordinary means from building and owning
homes, an authority which sustains the minimum wage will be invoked to support a maximum wage for building laborers and artisans, and the same argument which has been here urged to strip the
employer of his constitutional liberty of contract in one direction
will be utilized to strip the employee of his constitutional liberty
of contract in the opposite direction. A wrong decision does not
end with itself: it is a precedent, and, with the swing of sentiment,
its bad influence may run from one extremity of the arc to the
other."
In all of the legislation pertaining to minimum wages, one of
the most common arguments advanced is the cost of living argument. This principle was established during the War, when prices
were rising and is the reflex of arguments advanced on behalf of
labor. If this is a true basis for the enactment of Minimum Wage
Laws, then the converse should be true, viz., that when the cost of
living declines, wages should be reduced, but the wage earners who
were in favor of Minimum Wage Laws when, the cost of living was
rising, can see no justice in the proposition that there should be a
reduction when the cost of living declines.
The Supreme Court of the United States since the Adkins case,
has had occasion in later decisions, to refer to it and has, every
time, affirmed its former decision.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in its later decisions,
has affirmed the principle announced in the Adkins case, namely:
"While there is no such thing as absolute freedom of contract and
it is subject to a variety of restraints, they must not be arbitrary
or unreasonable. Freedom is the general rule and restraint the exception. The legislative authority to abridge it can be justified only
by exceptional circumstances."
And as late as January 17, 1927, the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed the decision in the Adkins case, by Memorandum Opinion in the Arkansas case, reported in 71 Law. Ed. p.
25 and also by a Memorandum Opinion in an Arizona case, reported
in 70 Law. Ed. 396.
Upon the authority of the Adkins case, the Federal District
Court of Wisconsin, on August 18, 1924, held' the Wisconsin Minimum, Wage Law unconstitutional, insofar as it applied to adult
women. 300 Fed. 991.
Our own Supreme Court has not as yet had an opportunity to
express itself, as to the validity of the North Dakota Minimum
Wage Law, as it applies to adult women workers.
There was one case up before the Supreme Court in 1921, reported in 182 N. W. 269, but that case involved only the validity
of certain orders made by the Minimum Wage Bureau, which

BAR BRIEFS

orders were subsequently held by the District Court in proceedings
had therein, to be invalid, on account of the method of promulgation,
but the validity of the Minimum Wage Law -itself was not involved.
In 1928, the Supreme Court had before it a case involving the
hours of employment for females, 221 N. W. 883, but no mention
of the Minimum Wage Law was made, except where the Court
referred to the Adkins case and called attention to the fact that that
case involved the right of the Legislature to fix a minimum wage
and that the United States Supreme Court, in its decision, was very
careful to distinguish between that kind of legislation and legislation fixing the hours-for labor, and also called attention to the fact
that the Adkins case recognized the right to fix the hours of labor
for females, under the police-power.
So, at the present time, we have no decision, by our Supreme
Court, or any Court, upon the validity of the North Dakota Minimum Wage Law, insofar as it affects adult women workers, but
we do have a Minimum Wage Law, and rules have been promulgated by the Bureau, under that law and it is in operation in this
State, despite the fact that its validity is very questionable.
The Massachusetts Minimum Wage Law, passed in 191.2, is the
only recommendatory law in the United States at the present time.
The other. fifteen or sixteen State Minimum Wage Laws, provide
for compulsory enforcement of the minimum wage dnd since the
Adkins case, their constitutionality is indeed, questionable. In fact,
the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Law, on account of it being entirely advisory in type, and not- compulsory, is probably the only
valid and constitutional Minimum Wage Law in the United States
and any statute which attempts to establish minimum wages in the
immediate future, and as long as there is no modification of the
rule laid down in the Adkins case,, should be of a recommendatory,
or advisory type, rather than compulsory.
In view of the decision in the Adkins case, what does the future
hold in store for Minimum Wage Laws?
There may be some question as to the future for laws of the
compulsory type, for while public opinion and sentiment caused
laws of that kind to be enacted and caused State Courts to uphold
their validity under the police-power of the State, nevertheless the
Supreme Court of the United States called a halt early enough so
that possibly thinking people will recover their sanity and will realize that legislation will not solve the problem, however, it's possible that in time the Adkins case may be,reversed or ignored and
once again, constitutional restraint and prohibition will be successfully overcome and conquered by that indefinable thing known as
the police-power.
In view of the fact that these laws are here and may possibly
increase in their scope, rather than diminish, let us turn to the
North Dakota Minimum Wage Law and see what if anything, has
been accomplished under it.
The first law to be enacted, was Chap. 181 of the Session Laws
of 1917, known as "The Public Welfare Committee," and under
that law, a slight interest was developed and sufficient done, so that
the Legislature in 1919, felt justified in passing an out-and-out
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Minimum Wage Law, which is Chap. 174 of the Session Laws of
1919, under which it was declared, among other things, that it
should be unlawful to employ women in any occupation within the
State for wages which are inadequate to supply the necessary costs
of living and to maintain them in health.
In addition to wages, the law also made it unlawful to employ
women or minors in any occupation for unreasonably long hours,
or to employ them under such surroundings or conditions, sanitary
or otherwise, as might be detrimental to their health or morals, or
to employ minors in any occupation for unreasonably low wages,
but as stated in the beginning, we are only concerned here with
minimum wages and I have completely eliminated from my discussion the matter of hours, sanitary conditions, etc.
Under investigations made in North Dakota in 1919, it was
determined that the average wage for women was $11.11 per week.
It was also found that the small towns paid higher wages than the
large towns and the investigators also found that in North Dakota
for the year of 1919, the average cost of living was about $16.00 per
week and on the data gathered, the investigators recommended that
the minimum wage in North Dakota for women in offices, mercantile pursuits, etc., be a weekly wage of $16.25 and that laundry
workers, chamber maids, kitchen help, etc., receive a weekly wage
of $15.50. In April, 1920, conferences were had as a result of which
recommendations were made and orders issued, fixing the weekly
minimum wage for women in North Dakota at $17.50 for waitresses, $16.70 for chambermaids and kitchen help, $20.00-for office
help and $16.50 for employees in manufacturing establishments,
laundries and telephone offices, and $17.50 for employees in mercantile establishments.
In the spring of 1921, the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that some of the orders fixing wages were invalid on account of the
law not having been' followed in the calling of the conferences and
the issuing of the orders, so the Bureau, in 1921, instigated a new
survey, with the idea of issuing new orders and by that survey, in
1921, it was found that the women of North Dakota were receiving
an average weekly wage of $16.15.
The North Dakota Minimum Wage Law -isnot entitled to any
credit for this increase, for the reason that it was not in actifal
operation during that period of time, its orders being the -subject
of litigation in the Courts. Also it's a matter of record that wages
of women throughout the United States and wages of men also,
have been on the increase since 1918 and have continued to increase,
in fact, in December of 1927, the average weekly wage of all women
in the United States was $17.34, and. that of all men $29.35.
In 1922 the Bureau, on the new surveys, issued Orders fixing
the weekly wage for women at an average of about $14.00 and at
the time that those orders were- issued, a survey disclosed that
women were actually receiving in the State of North Dakota, weekly
wages considerably in excess of the minimum wage.
Since 1922 the m'nimum wage orders in North Dakota have not
been changed but during. that period of time the average weekly
wages have fluctuated and the payroll reports on file in the office of
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the Department, show that in 1926, about 58 per cent of the women
employed were receiving wages in excess of the minimum of $14.00
per week and in 1927 only 53 per cent were receiving wages in
excess of the minimum. This may not prove the statement that
the minimum tends to become the maximum wage, but it at least
casts some doubt upon the benefits to be derived from a minimiim
wage and. there is certainly no reasonable basis upon which one can
reach the conclusion that the minimum wage law has in any way
raised the wages of the 'women employees, for as a matter of fact,
wages increased, generally throughput the country, whether there
were minimum wage laws in force or not and in a states where
there were minimum wage laws enacted, wages fluctuated from year
to year, the same as in other states.
In my study of the Minimum Wage Law, I have been somewhat
handicapped in that most of the available written material has been
prepared by people who were prejudiced in favor of the law, but in
studying the matter, I have tried' to separate the facts from the conclusions and have here presented to you what I consider an unbiased picture and while it may be too early in the life of the law
to draw any definite conclusions, still I have formed a rather definite
opinion:
That the Minimum Wage Laws were enacted by reason of a
3entimental public interest, created 'by the rapid increase in cost of
iving and the failure of wages to increase as rapidly, and further
agitated 'by the usual sympathetic appeal for women and children
working in factories and sweat-shops.
That the Minimum Wage Law is a violation of the Constitutional provision guaranteeing freedom of contract and is an attempt
to fix wages and is not sound fundamentally.
That by reason of public sentiment and opinion, the Courts may
finally be influenced to hold that such laws are a valid exercise of
the police-power, even though they know that it is a violent assumption to say that such laws are needed to safeguard the lives, health
and morals of women.
That there has been a general increase in wages throughout the
United States, but as only fifteen States have enacted minimum
wage lawys, no credit can be given to such laws for the increase in
wages.
That no amount of legislation will obtain for women the same
wages as men, as long as women are unable to do the same work,
with'the same degree of skill and efficiency as the men, and; with
the same assurance of permanency, for, to a large majority of the
women. employed in gainful occupations, a job is merely a stop-gap
before marriage and; no one employing them has any assurance that
after they have, learned the job and become of some real value, that
they will remain on the job.
That the Minimum Wage Law has deprived many women of
part-time jobs and small-pay jobs. These jobs made it possible for
many women who were not experienced and who could not hold
down regular jobs, to obtain employment and make sufficient to
help them while they. prepared themselves for better positions.
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There is one instance that I am personally acquainted with, where
a young lady had a position in a business establishment as operator
of the telephone switchboard and also performed some other odd
office work, for which work she received $35.00 a month and was
amply paid for what she did and well satisfied, but on account of
the Minimum Wage Law, she had to be let out and her work was
divided up among the other office help without any increase of pay
to them.
That as conditions become more settled, if there is an attempt
to fix minimum wages at a level that will afford a living, the tendency will be to reduce wages to the level, set by the Minimum Wage
Law and the minimum wage will then become the maximum wage.
That the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Law, which is of an
advisory and recommendatory type, instead of compulsory, is undoubtedly constitutional and has much of merit to recormnend it,
but there is no legislation or minimum wage law of any type, that
is going to obtain for the women increased wages.
As I said in the beginning, in the legal protection of women, we
are at the cross-roads. Which way shall we turn? One road leads
towards more laws for women, and the other towards none except
such as apply equally to men. If we honestly desire to advance the
position of women, is not the latter road the one to take?
If needed, enact legislation for both men and women workers,
but have it economically and legally sound and abreast of the times.
What women want is not protection, but the right to be recognized as wage earners; the right to be afforded the same opportunity
as men to earn a living and when they do the same work, to receive the same pay.
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REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES IN NORTH
DAKOTA
HON. MACK

V.

TRAYNOR

I do not know just why President Lewis selected me to give this
address. The only reason that I can think of is that he wanted me
to do. some much needed studying on a phase of the law that we all
should be familiar with. I am not presumptuous enough to believe
that I can tell any of you gentlemen anything about the law of real
estate mortgage foreclosures that you do not already know, nor can
I attempt, in the brief time allotted to me, to give any thorough
treatise on the law covering this subject. This address must necessarily be somewhat incoherent and does not in any sense attempt to
cover the law of real estate mortgage foreclosures in North Dakota.
If, however, I should happen to hit upon some phase of the law some
member of the Association may not know of, or some other member
may have overlooked or forgotten, then my efforts will not have
been in vain.
We have in this state two methods of real estate mortgagr
foreclosures, viz: Foreclosure by advertisement and foreclosure
by action. The law is somewhat overlapping with reference to the
two methods of foreclosure, but I deem it advisable to attempt -u
take them up separately.
FORECLOSURE BY ADVERTISEMENT

In 1919 the legislature passed a law requiring that in all foreclosure proceedings covering real property, either by action or
advertisement, that before the action or proceeding is commenced
a notice in writing shall be served more than thirty days prior to
such foreclosure and served by registered mail addressed to the
title owner of record at his last known postoffice address. Such
notice shall describe the land, the date afid amount of the mortgage, the amount due for principal, interest and taxes, and Shall
state that if the same is not paid within thirty days from the date
of the notice that proceedings will be commenced to foreclose the
mortgage. Our Supreme Court held in the case of Patterson Land
Company versus Merchants' Bank of Napoleon, 55 N. D., 90, that
this law did not apply to mortgages given prior to the passage of the
act, and then in Chapter 143 of the Session. Laws of 1927 the legislature also prbvided that this notice need not be given to mortgages
executed prior to July 1st, 1919.
The legislature has seen fit to change the method of serving this
notice before foreclosure at about every session of the legislature
held since the law was originally passed. The legislature of 1921
provided that the notice should be served by registered mail addressed to the title owner according to the records in the office of the
register of deeds at his or their postoffice address as shown by the

records in the office of the register of deeds, and if not shown, then
addressed to the owner at the postoffice nearest the land. The 1919
law was also amended in 1921 to provide that if an action or proceeding is not begun within ninety days after the date of such notice, that all proceedings shall be deemed discontinued. This was
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amended again in 1925 so that the notice should be served by registered mail addressed to the title owner according to the records in
the office of the register of deeds concerning and affecting the title
to the premises described in such notice at his or their postoffice add'ress as shown by such records, and if such address is not so shown,
personal service upon such owner or owners proven by the certificate
of the sheriff, or by the.affidavit of the person serving the same,
shall be sufficient, or if the sheriff's return, shows that after diligent
inquiry made for the purpose 'of serving such notice, he is unable to
make service thereof upon: the said title owner or owners of record
within the .county where the said- land is situated, then and in such
case, such notice shall not be required to be served upon such owner
or owners whose postoffice address is not shown by such records in
the office of the register of deeds.
The law was again amended in 1927 providing that service
should be made by registered mail addressed to the title owner at
his postoffice address, providing such postoffice address is shown
in the chain of title of such real estate in the records of the register of deeds, but if such postoffice address is not shown, then the
notice may be served by registered, mail addressed to the title owner
at the postoffice nearest to any part or tract of said real estate. The
1927 law provides further that if the title to such real estate is in
the name of a deceased person that no service of the notice need
be made, but if an administrator or executor of the estate of such
deceased person has been appointed in the county in which such
real estate is situated, such notice shall be served on such administrator or executor; provided further that personal service of such
notice on such title owner or on 'the administrator or executor,
-wherever appointed, made in the manner provided for service of a
summons, either within or without the state of North Dakota, shall
be sufficient.
The question naturally arises as to whioh law would apply to a
particular mortgage. In other words, what law would govern the
service of the notice in the matter of the foreclosure of a mortgage
given August 1st, 1925, or a mortgage given August 1st, 1927. Our
Supreme Court has never decided this question, but it would seem
that following the cgses of E. J. Lander & Company versus Deemy,
46 N. D., 274, Brewer versus Forsberg, 53 N. D., 262, and Patterson Land Company versus Merchants' Bank of Napoleon, 55 N. D.,
90, that the law in force at the time of the execution of the mortgage should control with reference to the service of the notice. On
the other hand, it might be argued that the method' of giving the
notice is only a matter of procedure so that so long as the mortgage
was executed subsequent to July 1st, 1919, and: a notice was required, that the law in force at the time of the sending of the notice
would control. We are not, however, going' to attempt to state
what the courts would hold, but it seems to us quite important that
actual notice be given to the title owner of the land.
PREREQUISITES TO RIGHT TO FORECLOSE

Of course, the first prerequisite is that the mortgage shall contain a power of sale and that there is a defau:lt in the terms and
conditions of the mortgage. The mortgage must also have been
duly recorded and, if assigned, all assignments must also be re-
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corded. The agent or attorney foreclosing the mortgage must have
a power of attorney from the mortgagee or assignee, and such
power of attorney must be filed for record, in the office of the register of deeds where said, real estate is located before the day fixed
for making -the sale. No action or proceeding shall have been instituted at law to recover the debt then remaining secured by such
mortgage or any part thereof; or if any action. or proceeding has
been instituted, the same must have been discontinued or an execution upon the judgment rendered therein has been returned unsatisfied in, whole or in part.
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS

After the thirty day period as provided in the notice before 'foreclosure has expired, then the publication of the notice of sale may
be made. This must 'be made by publication once in each week for
six consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation printed
and published in the county where the premises intended to be sold,
or some part thereof, a.re situated, and if there is no such paper in
said county, then in some newspaper published at the seat of government.
It 'has been held by our courts that six publications in six consecutive weeks, the last publication being the day before the sale,
is sufficient.
Bailey versus Hendrickson, 25 N. D., 500.
Our statute at Section 8080 provides a form of notice which
must be substantially complied with. In this state the rule has been'
stated by our court that in a foreclosure sale the statute is substantially complied with when the notice itself states facts correctly
pertaining to the record, which record, if examined, would conclusively show the error in the notice, and, further, that the rule
of substantial compliance applies instead of strict and literal compliance.
McCardia v. Billings, 10 N. D., 373; 87 N. W. 1008.
Kyllonen. v. Acme Harvesting Machine Co., 48 N. D., 38,
182 N. W. 249.
The sale must be made at public auction between the hours of
nine A. M. and the setting of the sun on that day, in the county
in which the premises to be sold, or some part of them, are situated,
and must be made by the sheriff, acting in person or by his deputy,
to the highest bidder.
If the mortgaged premises consists of distinct farms, tracts or
lots tliey must be sold separately, and' no more farms, tracts or lots
must be sold than shall be necessary to satisfy the amount due on
such mortgage at the date of sale and the costs and-expenses allowed by law.
Section. 8082.
Our court has held that a sale of several tracts en masse is not
void' but voidable and must be attacked, timely. It has been. held
further that an attack within the redemption period is a timely
attack. Michael versus Grady, 52 N. D. 740; 204 N. W. 182..
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It has been held further that where a party waited until sixteen
months had elapsed, since the sale and four months since the time
for redemption had expired before questioning the sale that he had
waived -his right to set aside the sale for inadequacy of price and
because of the irregularity in selling several tracts in one mass.
Power versus Larabee, 3 N. D., 50.2; 57 N. W., 789. In.the case
of Michael versus Grady, supra, the court stated that the determining -factor is whether or not prejudice is suffered by reason of the
failure to comply with the statutory requirement.
It 'has further been held by our court that where the premises
do not consist of distinct farms, parcels or lots, they need not be
divided. Greene versus Newberry, 55 N. D., 783; 215 N. W., 273.
The mortgagee or his assigns may fairly and in good faith
purchase the premises at such sale and the officer making the sale
shall immediately give to the purchaser a certificate of sale containing:
1.
2.
3.
4.

A particular description of the real property sold.
The price bid for each distinct lot or parcel.
The whole price paid.
The costs and fees for making -the sale.

Stich certificate must be executed and, acknowledged and must
be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county where
the real property is situated within sixty days from the date of sale.
Section 8084.
. In case the mortgage was executed subsequent to July 1st, 1919,
the notice before foreclosure, together with affidavit of service thereon, must be recorded with the sheriff's certificate.
COSTS AND FEES FOR MAKING THE SALE

The publication fees are controlled by statute, but whiat we are
mostly interested in is the question of the attorney fees. Prior to
the legislative session of 1919, the attorney fees in mortgage foreclosures was governed by Section 7792, which provides that when
the amount of the debt secured by such mortgage or lien does not
exceed $500.00 the fee shall be $ 5.00, and when 'the amount of the
debt exceeds $500.00 and does not exceed $1000.00. the fee shall be
$50.00, and when the amount of the debt exceeds $1000.00 and does
not exceed $2000.00 the fee shall be $75.00, and when the amount
of the debt exceed's $2000.00 the fee shall be $75.00 and in addition
thereto 2% on the amount so secured in excess of $2000.00. The
statute provides further that the fee shall not be allowed unless the
foreclosure proceedings shall be conducted under the supervision
of an attorney duly 'authorized to practice in the courts of thi's state
and unless an attorney's affidavit -relative to division of fees shall
be filed in the office of the register of deeds prior to the time of sale
stating that the full amount of such fees inures solely to the benefit
of the attorney foreclosing the mortgage.
Chapter 130 of the Session Laws of 1919, however, provides that
on the foreclosure of any lien or mortgage by advertisement, attorney fees shall not exceed 10% of the principal sum actually due,
and shall in no case exceed $25.00, and the sheriff fees shall-not
exceed $3,00. The question naturally arises as to whether or not'
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the 1919 law applies to mortgages executed prior to the passage of
this law. No decision has -been rendered on this subject by our
Supreme Court -and we believe that the majority of the attorneys
follow the 1919 law in all foreclosures, regardless of the date of
execution of the mortgage, although we have noticed that some
attorneys still tax the attorney fees in accordance with Section 7792
in cases. where the mortgage was executed prior -to July 1st, 1919.
We will not attempt to state what our Supreme Court might rule
on the question of which law would govern with reference to the
mortgages executed prior to July 1st, 1919. Regardless of what
the law might be,. it is self-evident that a fee of $25.00 is not
adequate for the foreclosure of any mortgage and that the only
and proper thing for members of the Bar to do is to follow the
schedule of fees as adopted by the State Bar Association when
rendering a statement to clients.
RENTS AND PROFITS

Prior to July 1st, 1919, this was governed ,by Section 7762,
which provided that the purchaser from the time of sale until a
redemption and a redemptioner from the -time of his redemption
until another redemption is entitled to receive from the tenant in
possession the rents of the property sold, or the value of the use
and occupation thereof. This was amended by Chapter 132 of the
Session laws of 1919, which provides that the debtor under an
execution or foreclosure sale of -his property shall be entitled to the
possession, rents, use and benefit of the property sold from the
date of such sale until the expiration of the period of redemption.
Our Supreme Court has held, 'however, that the 1919 law is
applicable only to mortgages executed and delivered after it became
operative, and, is inapplicable to mortgages executed and delivered
prior to that time. First National Bank of Turtle Lake versus
Bovey-Shute & Jackson; 48 N. D., 450; 191 N. W. 765
PERIOD OF REDEMPTION.

This is controlled by Section 8085 of the 1913 Code and Section
7754 of the'Supplement. Section 7754 provides that the judgment
debtor or redemptioner may redeem the property from the purchaser within one year after the sale on paying the purchaser the
amount of his puTchase with 8% interest thereon, together with
the amount -of any assessment or taxes which the purchaser may
have paid thereon after the purchase, and interest at the same rate
on such amount; and if the purchaser is also a creditor having a
prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment
under which such, purchase was made, the amount of such lien
with interest.
This Section. was interpreted by our. courts in the case of Styles
versus Dickey, 22 N. D., 515; 134"N. W., 702. This case refers
back to Section 7324 of the 1913 Code which provides as follows:
"7324. Computation of time. The time in which any
act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding
the first day and including the last, unless the last is a holiday,
and, then it is also excluded."
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Our Code further provides that every Sun-day is a holiday so
that, therefore, in case a sale was held on Saturday, September 8th,
1928, the debtor or redemptioner would have to and including
Monday, September 9th, 1929, within which to redeem because of
the fact that the last day of redemption falls on Sunday, September
8th, 1929. In spite of the fact that the law seems to be very definite
and set on this particular question, we have noticed sheriff deeds
which some attorneys have caused to be issued on the last day of
redemption.
ENJOINING FORECLOSURES BY ADVERTISEMENT

A foreclosure by advertisement may be enjoined by the affidavit
of the mortgagor, his agent or attorney showing to the satisfaction
of the judge of the district court of the county where the mortgaged
property is situated that the mortgagor has a legal counterclaim or
any other valid -defense against the collection of the whole or any
part of the amount claimed to be due in the mortgage. The judge
will order further that all further proceedings for the foreclosure
shall be had in the district court properly having jurisdiction of
the subject matter.
The courts are, as a rule, quite liberal in enjoining these foreclosures and the power to enjoin is discretionary and only disturbed
for abuse. Beiseker versus Svendsgaard, 28 N. D., 366; 149
N. W. 352.
The order is granted ex parte. Counter affidavits are not allowed. McCarty versus Goodsman, 40 N. D., 220; 168 N. W. 721.
Our court has also interpreted this Section to mean that the
term mortgagor includes within its meaning any person claiming
title to the mortgaged premises under and in privity with the original mortgagor. Scott and Wheeler versus District Court, et al,
15 N. D., 259; 107 N. W., 61.
Security Bank v. Buttz, 21 N. D., 540; 131 N. W., 241.
Our court has quoted with approval the law to the effect that
where a foreclosure by advertisement is enjoined the costs and
expenses incurred therein are properly taxable as items of costs
in the foreclosure action where the party prosecutin:r the foreclosure prevails in the action.
"And as a general rule, a mortgagee who 'has been
wrongfully enjoined from proceeding to sell mortgaged
premises by advertisement is erititled to be reimbursed for
the expenses occasioned by the injunctional order."
McCarty v. Goodsman, et al, 40 N. D., 220; 168 N. W., 721.
FORECLOSURE BV ACTION

I have not attemptedi to cover the entire law of foreclosure by
advertisement, nor can I attempt, in the brief time allotted to me,
to cover the entire field of foreclosures by action. The law with
reference to the notice -before foreclosure applies to foreclosures by
action as well as foreclosures by advertisement. The attorney must
also 'have a power of attorney to foreclose And, the possession of
such power of attorney shall be alleged, in the complaint. Default
shall have occurred, in the terms and conditions of the mortgage and
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the mortgage must have been recorded and all assignments thereof
recorded. There must be an allegation in the complaint that no
action or proceeding shall have been instituted at law to recover
the debt then remaining secured by the mortgage, or any part thereof; or if -any action or proceeding has been instituted, that the same
has been discontinued or that an execution, upon. the judgment rendered therein, has been. returned unsatisfied in whole or in part.
After judgment has been obtained, which judgment will provide for
the sale of the mortgaged premises, or so much threof as may be
sufficient to pay the amount adjudged to be due and the costs of
sale, then special execution must be issued, but no levy or filing
or service of notice of levy is necessary as in the case of a general
execution.
Winslow vs. Klundt, 51 N. D., 808; 201 N. W., 169.
The sale must be made by a referee, sheriff or his deputy of the
county or subdivision where the court in which the judgment is
rendered is held, or other person appointed by the -court for that
purpose, and must be made in the county or subdivision, where the
premises, or some part thereof, are situated and shall be made upon
the like notice and in the same manner as provided by law for the
sale of real property upon execution. In other words, publication
must be made in a newspaper of general circulation printed and publis-hed in,the county or subdivision where the real property to be
sold is situated, and that such publication must be once a week for
at least 30 days prior to the making of such sale. In case there is
no newspaper printed in such county, then 'the officer making such
sale must cause advertisement to be made by posting a copy of such
advertisement on the outer door of the court house or building
where the district, court of the county or subdivision was last held,
and in five other places in the county. The sale must be held at the
court 'house, if there is one in the county or subdivision in which
said real estate is situated, and if 'there is no court house, then at the
door of the house in which the district court was last held, and if
there is no court house and no district court has been held in the
county or subdivision, then at such place within, the county or subdivision 'as the sheriff shall designate in his notice of sale.
The sale must be held and made at public auction to the highest
bidder, between the hours of nine A. M., and four P. M. The judgment debtor, if present at tthe sale, may direct the order in, which the
property shall be sold', and the sheriff or other officer must follow
siih directions.
Our Supreme Court has held that Section 7719, Compiled' Laws
of 1919, requiring executions to be returned within 60 days is purely
directory in so far as special 'execution under mortgage foreclosure
is concerned.
Workman v. Salzer Lumber Company, 51 N. D. 280; 199 N. W.
769. In any event, Section 7750, Compiled Laws of 1913, provides
for sale after the 60 day period in case of general executions when
the sale has not been held on account of irregularities in giving
notice thereof; or 'because of its postponement, and the officer shall
in his return set forth the facts regarding such failure or postponement.
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Upon such sale the purchaser is substituted to and acquires all
the right, title and interest and claim of tfhe judgment debtor to such
real property; and when the estate is less than a leasehold of two
years' unexpired term, the sale is absolute. In other cases the real
property is subject to redemption and the officer gives the purchaser
a certificate of sale containing" One, a particular description of the
real property sold. Two, the price bid for each distinct lot or parcel. Three, the whole price bid. Four, when subject to redemption
it must be so stated.
The certificates must be executed and acknowledged by the officer and must be recorded, in. the office of the register of deeds
wherein such real property i5 -situated within 60 days from the date.
of sale. Unlike foreclosure by advertisement, however, the notice
before foreclosure is not rec'orded mith the sheriff's certificate, but
the law provides that the notice with proof of service shall be filed
with the clerk of court at the time of filing the complaint.
The law with, reference -to the possession; rents and profits and
use in occupation of the premises and also in, regard, to redemption
is the same in foreclosure by action as in foreclosure by advertisement. Time, however, does not permit the writer to go into the
subject of redemption or the manner in which redemption must be
made.
Validating Provisions
We all may have made some mistakes in foreclosing mortgages,
but we seem to have had some friends in the legislature who have
been quite busy correcting our mistakes. In the 1925 Supplement
we find two such provisions.
"Section 8076a1. Validating prior sales. All sales of real
estate made prior to the passage and approval of- this act
under executions issued pursuant to judgments entered in
actions for the foreclosure of real estate mortages, are hereby
declared to be 'legal and valid, for all purposes, even though
no power of attorney was filed for record in the office of the
register of deed's of the county wherein said real estate was
located prior to the day of sale of said real estate, provided
such a power of attorney as is provided for, in section 8075
of the Compiled Laws of North Dakota for 1913 was filed in
the office of the clerk of the district court of the county in
which such judgment was entered', prior to such date of sale.
(Laws 1925, ch. 141, Section 2; Laws 1923, ch. 2,50, Section
2.) Mortgages 27 Cyc. 1450, 1695, 1732."
"Section 8076a2. 'Same. All sales of real estate made
under a mortgage foreclosure prior to the passage and approval of 'thisact, are hereby declared legal and' valid for all
purposes, even though no power of attorney was filed for
record in the office of the register of deeds of the county
wherein sai ' real estate was located, before the day of sale
of said real estate, provided said power -of attorney as is
provided for in Section 8075 of the Compiled Laws of North
Dakota for 1913 was filed for record in the office of the register of deeds of the c6unty wherein said real estate is located,
at or prior to the time fixed or appointed, to make the sale.
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(Laws 1925, ch. 141, Section 3.) Mortgages, 27 Cyc. 1450,
1695, 1732."
The legislature of 1927 passed the following validating provision with reference to mortgage foreclosures, to-wit:
Chapter 143 .........
"2. All sales of real estate made or that may hereafter
be made under a mortgage foreclosure of mortgages executed prior to July 1st, 1919, are (hereby declared legal and
valid for all purposes even though no notice of intention to
foreclose has been given or served as provided in Chapter 131
of the Session, Laws of 1919, as amended by Chapter 66
of the Session Laws of 1921, as amended by Chapter 142 of
the Session Laws of 1925."
Chapter 276.
"That all legal publications of any kind or character,
which prior to the 1st day of January, 1927, have been made
in a newspaper other than a newspaper legally designated
therefor under the provisions of Chapter 187 of Session
Laws, 1919, and of the Initiated Measure relating to Official
Newspapers approved November 2, 1920, are hereby declared
legal and valid for all purposes."
Chapter 277.
"After six months from and after this act takes effect no
action shall be commenced to set -aside the foreclosure of a
mortgage and no foreclosure of a mortgage shall thereafter
be set aside, and no defense shall be interposed in an action
based upon the foreclosure of such mortgage, by virtue of
any defect in the form, substance,. service or manner of service of the nofice of intention to foreclose such mortgage,
which mortgage 'has been foreclosed prior to the taking effect
of this Act."
Chapter 279.
Par. 1.
"Any sale of real estate, made prior to the taking effect of
this act, whether under execution or in foreclosure of a
mortgage by advertisement, is hereby declared to be legal
and valid for all purposes, even though the sheriff's certificate
of sale, issued in completion of such sale, was not filed for
record in the office of the register of deeds within sixty days
after the date of such execution or foreclosure sale."
In the 1929 Session Laws we find the following validation provisions, to-wit:
Chapter 257.
"1. Sale of Real Estate at Foreclosure Made by Agent or
Attorney. That all sales of real estate upon foreclosure made
by an,agent or attorney between July 1st, 1901, and July 1st,
1903, shall -be valid for all purposes notwithstanding that a
power of attorney authorizing such foreclosure by such agent
or attorney was not procured nor filed in the office of the
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register of deeds of the county wherein said real estate is
located before the day fixed or appointed to make the sale
or at all as then required by Chapter 132 of the Laws of 1901.
Provided that the provisions of this act shall not apply to any
action or proceeding now pending or heretofore had in any
of the courts of this state in which notice of lispendens shall
have been recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the
county in which such land is situated, prior to the passage
of this act."
Chapter 258.
"1. All sales of real estate made under a mortgage forec!osure of mortgages prior to the passage and taking effect
of this act are hereby declared legal and valid for all purposes, even though the power of attorney to foreclose was
not recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the countv wherein said real estate is located on or before the date
of sale, providing the power of attorney to foreclose was
executed before the date of sale, and is recorded in the office
of the register of deeds of the county wherein, said real estate
is located within six months after 'the taking effect of this
act."
This addiress or thesis does not purport to be in any manner
complete on the law of real estate mortgage foreclosures in North
Dakota, but all that we felt we could do or attempt to do in the brief
space of time allotted to us was to hit a few of the high, spots in
regard to some phases of this question.

